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This  paper  describes  and  analyses  the  period  1985-1990  during which 
Belgium  successfully  completed  the  process  of  restructur lng  its 
economy  In  order  to  cope  with  the  Imbalances  it  was  left  with  at 
the  beginning  of  the  decade.  Although  this  story  Is  predominantly 
one  of  success,  one  major  problem  remains  unresolved  :  the  high 
pub I lc  debt  burden  and  the  moderate  progress  In  reducing  the 
current  budget  deficit.  In  this  context  particular  attention  will 
be  paid  to  the  Implications  of  the  regional  devolution  process  for 
f I  sea I  conso II datI  on.  WIth  respect  to  monetary  poI Icy  new 
Instruments  are  In  preparation  and  the  pos!tlon  of  the  Belgian 
franc  was  strengthened  leading  to  the  public  commitment  to  follow 
the  strong  EMS-currencies.  Also  In  the  field  of  the  adaptation  of 
f I  nanc I  a I  market  to  a  more  competItIve  envIronment,  progress  has 
been  made  which  should  however  be  consolidated  by  Intensifying  the 
modernization effort. 
After  reviewing  briefly the situation of  the Belgian economy  In  the 
first  half of  the  1980s,  the  paper  analyses  developments  since  1985 
and  gives  macroeconomic  forecasts  for  1991  (chap.  2).  It  looks  In 
turn  at  the  stance  and  resu Its  of  budgetary  po II cy  (Chap.  3), 
developments  In  exchange  rate  policy  and  monetary  policy 
Instruments  (Chap.  4)  and~  lastly,  the  efforts  made  to  modernize 
and  develop  financial  markets  and  services  In  the  run-up  to  1992 
(Chap.  5). 
2.  ECONOMIC  PERFORMANCE  SINCE  1985  AND  OUTLOOK  FOB  1990-91 
2.1  Recent  growth  Performance 
In  the  early  1980s,  the  Belgian  economy  suffered  from  ser lous 
Imbalances:  sluggish  growth,  mounting  unemployment,  a  sizable 
current  account  deficit,  a  high  Inflation  rate  and  a  deteriorating 
pub I lc  finance situation. 
The  1982  devaluation  of  the  Belgian  franc  and  the  set  of 
accompanyIng  measures  marked  a  turnIng  poInt  In  economIc  poI Icy, 
which  resulted  In  a  steady  but  firm  move  to  recovery.  By  1985,  the 
current  balance  reached  equl llbrlum,  mainly  as  a  result  of 
depressed  domestic  demand.  Although  a  dominant  component  of 
government  strategy  was  the  restoration  of  competitiveness  and  of 
enterprise  profltabl I lty,  Investment  figures  remained 
disappointing.  1985  however  was  the  last  year  that  GOP  grew  by  less 
than  1%;  1986  showed  the  first  signs  of  a  fundamental  recovery  as 
GOP  grew  1.6%  In  real  terms;  private  consumption  was  the  main 
factor  of  growth,  reflecting  the  upsurge  In  real  disposable  Income 
of  households  after  several  years  of  downward  adjustment  - through 
Index  jumps  and  other  measures  - which  served  to  restore  company's 
profltabl I lty ratio. T
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Another  remarkable  feature  was  the  back-drop  of  Inflation.  The 
process  of  Inflation  reduction  had  been  going  on  for  several  years 
through  the  containment  of  domestic  cost  components.  However,  the 
fal I  In  Inflation was  mainly  due  to  the evolution of  Import  prices, 
which  fel I  on  average  by  more  than  15%.  Although  Inflation 
virtually  stopped,  Import  prIce  falls  were  not  completely  passed 
through  Into  final  prices.  As  a  consequence,  profit  margins,  which 
already  had  recovered substantially,  were  further  Improved. 
The  pIcture  for  1987  was  quIte  s lm II ar:  prIvate  consumption  was 
sustained  notwithstanding  the  third  Index  jump  and  the  ful I 
Implementation  of  a  number  of  measures  contained  In  the  1986 
St  Anna  plan  to  reduce  the  net  borrowing  requirement.  Private 
Investment  picked  up  reflecting  the  return  of  confidence  of 
entrepreneurs  and  the  strong  Improvement  In  the  financial  position 
of  firms. 
In  1988,  business  investment  rose  by  an  estimated  14%;  to  this was 
added  an  explosion  In  residential  construction of  over  20%.  Unlike 
previous  years  when  replacement  Investment  dominated,  the  surge  In 
Investment  activity  was  mainly  concentrated  In  an  expansion  of 
capacIty. 
Private consumption  was  healthy.  Exports of  goods  and  services  rose 
by  7.4%  .n  real  terms  as Belgium  continued  to gain market  snares  in 
an  expanding  International  trade  environment.  Imports  Increased  by 
the  same  amount  under  the  Influence  of  the  expansion  of  final 
demand;  the  fact  that  the  Increase  was  stl II  relatively  low  (given 
the  trad It lona I  hIgh  Import  e I  ast I  cIty  of  demand  components  I Ike 
Investment  and  private  consumption)  reflects  the  structural 
adjustment  of  Belgian  Industry,  which  resulted  In  a  better  response 
to  emerging  demands.  It  Is  also  clear  that  Belgium  now  took 
advantage of  the  system  of  automatic wage  Indexation,  through  which 
the  fal I  In  Inflation  was  directly  passed  through  Into wages.  As  a 
result,  1988  GOP  grew  by  some  4.3%,  above  the Community  average. 
Developments  In  1989  have  shown  almost  the  same  picture:  a  boom  In 
Investment  by  enterprises,  strong  activity  In  the  construction 
sector,  healthy  exports  and  a  sustained  domestic  consumption 
demand.  The  Intensity of  the  Investment  boom  reflected  the  need  to 
anticipate  emerging  capacity  constraints,  although  no  Immediate 
signs of overheating were  apparent. T
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As  In  the case of  the  rest of  the Community,  the  forecasts  for  1990 
and  1991(1)  point  to  something  of  a  slowdown  In  economic  growth 
from  the  part lcular ly  high  rates  of  growth  recorded  In  1988  and 
1989.  The  compos It I  on  of  growth  Is  expected  to  change  somewhat , 
with  Investment  and  exports  slowing  down  wh,lle  private  consumption 
continues  to grow  at  the  same  rate.  AI  I  In  all,  GOP  growth  (3%  and 
2.5%)  respectively  Is  expected  to  be  sl lghtly  higher  than  the 
Community  average  (3.0%  and  3.1%),  with  domestic  demand  probably 
being  a  I lttle firmer. 
2.2  Laboyr  market  deyelooments 
After  several  years  of  decline,  employment  picked  up  In  1985  and 
has  continued  to  rise  until  now.  Job  creation  was  exclusively 
concentrated  In  the private sector,  reflecting  the  Influence of  the 
hIgher  I  eve Is  of  actIvIty;  government  emp I  oyment  vIr tua I I  y 
stagnated  over  the  period.  Measured  by  the  number  of  persons,  the 
average  yearly  growth  rate  was  near  one  per  cent  with  an 
acceleration  In  1988  and  1989.  On  a  full-time  eQuivalent  basis, 
growth  was  however  significantly  lower,  because of  a  strong rise  In 
part-time  jobs.  This  phenomenon  Is  partially related  to  the actual 
low  share  of  part-time  jobs  In  Belgium  compared  to  the  one  In 
neighbouring  countries- In  1987,  part-time  jobs  represented  9%  of 
total  employment  against  25%  In  the  Netherlands,  22%  In  the  UK,  13% 
In  Germany  and  12%  In  France;  furthermore,  unemployment  benefIts 
can  be  aggregated  with  part-time  Income,  which  makes  this  way  of 
working  particularly  advantageous  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
wage-earner. 
From  a  sectoral  point  of  view  employment  creation  has  been  broadly 
based  In  recent  years.  It  should  be  seen  In  the  context  of  the 
strong  expansion  of  capacity-widening  Investment  In  1988  and  1989; 
as  a  result,  the  trend  of  employment  destruction  In  manufacturing 
Industry  has  been  reversed. 
The  evolution of  the  labour  force over  the  period was  moderate,  due 
to  the  absence  of  strong  demographic  factors  and  mainly  because of 
the  continued  effect  of  several  labour  containment  pol Icy  measures 
I Ike  ear I  y  retIrement  schemes  and  the  career  Interrupt I  on  scheme 
which  originated  In  the  early  eighties.  As  a  result,  the 
unemployment  rate  has  fallen  from  11.7%  In  1985  to  some  8.9%  In 
1990. 
Notwithstanding  this  positive evolution,  the  labour  market  appears 
far  from  ba I  anced  :  the  number  of  unf II I  ed  vacancIes  has  grown 
sharply  while  the  proportion  of  the  long-term  unemployed  Is  stl II 
rising.  Furthermore,  Interregional  and  lnterprofesslonal  mobil lty 
prob I  ems  are  occur 1  ng  In  a  number  of  sectors  whIch  have  known  a 
strong upsurge  In  demand  In  recent  years. 
(1)  Commission  departments,  May  1990. -7-
Labour  market  policy  should  consequently  be  oriented  more  towards 
enhancing  training  facl I ltles;  the  room  for  manoeuvre  In  this 
respect  has  however  been  seriously  limited  by  previous  efforts  to 
contain  the  overall  evolution  of  government  expenditure.  Since 
training  of  the  unemployed  has  now  become  a  responsibility  of  the 
I lngulstlc  communities  It  may  become  more  efficient  and  less 
constrained.  In  addition,  a  number  of  measures  seem  necessary  to 
Improve  Interregional  mobility  with  a  view  to  ensur lng  that  the 
Imbalances  between  the  different  subregions  In  the  country  are  not 
aggravated. 
2.3 Wage  formation.  price developments  and  competitiveness 
The  lnf I  at !on  rate,  wh lch  was  stIll  around  6X  In  1985,  I.e.  four 
percentage  points  higher  than  In  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  fell 
sharply  up  to  1988  (1.8%).  The  differential  vis-a-vis  Germany  has 
been  el lmlnated.  External  dlslnflatlonary  factors,  which  were 
accentuated  by  a  fIrmer  exchange  rate,  pI ayed  a  cruc I  a I  ro I  e  In 
1986-87  whereas  It  was  domestic  factors  that  were  more  Important  In 
1987-88.  The  effects  of  wage  restraInt  on  prIces  were,  however, 
mitigated  as  a  result  of  the  appreciable  Improvement  In  firms' 
profit margins.  A mechanical  breakdown  of  the  Inflation rate shows, 
among  other  things,  that  the  Increase  In  the  gross  operating 
surplus  has,  In  practically  every  year  since  1982,  contributed 
around  one  percentage  point  to  the  Increase  In  the  price  deflator 
for  total  final  expenditure  (cf.  Table  5). 
Whereas,  In  the  period  1982-86,  the  Government  had  pursued  an 
active  Incomes  policy  with  the  twofold  aim  of  restoring  business 
profltabl I lty and  Improving  export  competitiveness,  wage  bargaining 
has  s I  nee  become  decent ra I I  zed  once  agaIn.  AutomatIc  wage 
lndexat lon  Is  being  applied  In  the  form  devised  In  1983,  I.e.  on 
the  bas Is  of  a  four-month  movIng  average  for  the  consumer  prIce 
Index  and  no  longer  on  the  basis of  the  monthly  Index  as  had  been 
the  case  prior  to  1982.  The  Government  has,  nevertheless,  given 
Itself  the  necessary  statutory  powers  to  safeguard  competitiveness 
as  broadly defined should  It  be  threatened.  Under  the  Law  passed  In 
January  1989  (see  box),  the  level  of  competitiveness  Is  regularly 
monitored  by  the  Central  Economic  Council  applying  a  range  of 
Indicators  that  Includes  an  outturn  Indicator  - relative  export 
performances  - and  Indicators  measuring  conditions.  The  latter 
Include  not  only  relative changes  In  wage  costs per  person employed 
compared  with  the  country's  seven  leading  trading  partners<1>  but 
also data  such  as  the  comparative  trend  In  financial  costs,  energy 
costs  and  the  "structura  1••  determInants  of  competItIveness,  as  a 
function of capital  expenditure  by  firms.  Among  the different  forms 
of  Intervention  envisaged,  the  Government  can  be  empowered  to 
suspend  wage  Indexation  temporarl ly. 
(1)  Germany,  France,  Italy,  Netherlands,  United  Kingdom,  United States, 
Japan. T
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The  Increase  In  nominal  wages  per  person  employed  has  slowed  down 
appreciably since  1984.  During  the  period  1984-88,  It  averaged  3%  a 
year,  as against  close on  5%  for  alI  the countries participating  In 
the  EMS  exchange-rate  mechanism.  However,  If  account  Is  taken  of 
the  comparative  trend  of  productivity,  which  had  been  particularly 
weak  throughout  the  Belgian  economy  up  to  1.986,  the  slowdown  In 
wages  meant  that  unit  wage  costs  moved  In  parailel  with  unit  wage 
costs  In  Belgium's  partners  between  1984  and  1986.  The  upturn  In 
activity  In  1987  and  1988,  coupled  with  a  very  slight  Increase  In 
nominal  wages,  lead  to a  decl lne  In  unit  wage  costs  (see Table  4). 
Over  the  per lod  1984-89,  the  policy  of  wage  restraint  meant  that 
cost  competitiveness  remained  at  the  relatively  favourable  level 
achieved  following  the  devaluation  of  the  Belgian  franc.  Taking 
unit  wage  costs  In  Belgium  compared  with  Its  EMS  partners,  the  real 
exchange  rate  experienced,  It  Is  true,  a  temporary  appreciation  In 
1984-85  as  a  result  of  the  tighter  exchange-rate  policy  pursued  by 
the  authorities.  In  1987  and  1988,  however,  the  decline  In  unit 
wage  costs  In  Belgium  produced  a  fall  In  the  real  exchange  rate 
despite  a  slight  appreciation  In  nominal  terms  (see  Graphs  1  and 
2). 
price  and  cost  developments  In  1989  and  the  outlook  for  1990  and 
1991  are  less  satisfactory.  The  Industry  agreements  concluded  at 
the  end  of  1988  for  the  period  1989-90  envisage  an  average  Increase 
In  real  wages  of  2%  a  year  for  most  Industries.  According  to  the 
most  recent  Commission  forecasts,C1)  the  rise  In  unit  wage  costs 
Is  expected  to accelerate  (+3.0%  In  1989  and  +3.3%  In  1990)  while 
remaInIng  modest  and  close  to  the  expected  average  for  a II  the 
coyntr les  part lclpat log  In  the  exchange-rate  mechanism.  In 
manufacturing,  as  a  result  of  the  anticipated  productivity  gains, 
the  Increase  wl  I I  probably  be  a  little slower  than  elsewhere  In  the 
economy.  Assuming  that  the  present  exchange-rate  policy  Is 
maintained,  the  competitiveness of  the  Belgian  economy  In  terms  of 
relative  costs  vis-a-vis  Belgium's  EMS  partners  could  worsen 
sl lghtly  (see Graph  2). 
(1)  On  the  basis of  the  May  1990  economic  forecasts. -10-
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100  100 
90  ...
... ············ 
.········  .··  ············ 
.. .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .. .  . .  ....... ·  ...... ··. ·· · /1.-- v-i  s--o--v-i  s-IC-20--.I 
1990  and  1991  :  forecasts of March  1990 
Soyrce  :  Commission  departments 
GRAPH  2  REAL  EFFECTIVE  EXCHANGE  RATE 
(whole  economy)(1) 
90 
80 
100  100 
90 
80 
I  vis-a-vis  OAS I 
·········.  ··· ... 
·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ·  ................. ·  ...... ·,  vis-a-vis  IC20 f  ... ···········. 
(1)  On  the  basis of  unit  wage  costs. 
1990  and  1991  :  forecasts of  May  1990 
Source  :  Commission  departments 
90 
··········· 
80 
70 J) 
- 11-
As  In  most  Member  States,  the  faster  pace  of  Inflation discernible 
since  mld-1988  stemmed  Initially  from  higher  energy  prices  and  the 
appreciation  of  the  dollar.  These  external  factors  have  been 
compounded  by  the  prIce  I  ncr  eases  announced  for  certaIn  pub II c 
services  In  1989  and  especially,  by  the  Increase  In  certain excise 
duties  In  1989  and  1990,  designed  to  offset  In  part  the  budgetary 
Impact  of  the  reform  of  direct  taxatlon<1>.  The  Inflation  rate 
quickened  from  1%  In  mld-1988  to  3.4X  In  February  1990.  Since 
profIt  margIns  have  been  stead I I  y  reconstItuted  s I  nee  1982,  an 
Increase  In  Import  costs can,  to  begin  with,  be  offset  by  trimming 
back  those  margIns.  Even  so,  If  the  externa I  pressures  on  costs 
continue  and  eventually  feed  through  Into  prices,  they  wl  I I 
Influence  wages  via  the  Indexation  mechanism.  As  for  the  Increase 
In  excise  duties,  Its  Impact  wl  I I  be  automat leal ly  ampl I fled 
through  Its repercussions on  wages. 
AccordIng  to  the  Inter lm  report  on  competItIveness  submIt ted  In 
September  by  the  Central  Economic  Council,  there  Is  also  some  risk 
that  the situation wl  I I  worsen:  whl  le  Belgium  continues  to capture 
market  shares  and  whl le  relative  profltabll tty  remains  sound, 
domestic costs wl  I I  rise much  more  rapidly  In  1990  than  the  average 
for  the seven  partner  countries mentioned. 
In  the  medium  term.  the  outlook  for  Inflation  wll I  also  depend  on 
the  pressures  associated  with  a  continuing,  sustained  rate  of 
actIvIty.  The  rate  of  productIve  capacIty  ut II I  zat I  on  has  rIsen 
appreciably  since  the  end  of  1987;  while,  taking  the  average  for 
Industry,  It  stl I I  stood  at  only  80.5%  In  mld-1989,  levels 
approaching  or  exceeding  90X  In  some  Industries  have  been 
recordedC2>.  Major  problems  are  being  encountered  In  the 
construction  Industry  particularly.  In  some  other  branches, 
however,  the  recent  Investment  drive  has  focused  on 
capacity-augmenting  schemes.  There  Is  also  a  danger  that  the 
labour-market  bottlenecks  arising  from  a  geographical  and 
occupational  mismatch  between  supply  and  demand  will  fuel  rising 
Inflation via  the pressures on  wages  that  might  be  generated. 
(1)  Excise  duties  have  been  Increased  In  three  stages  (January  1989, 
August  1989  and  January  1990).  The  direct  Impact  on  the  Index  Is 
put  at  some  0.7X  for  the  two  years.  Taking  the  Induced  effects 
(wage  Indexation  and  maintenance  of  profit  margins  In  real  terms), 
the  final  Impact  wl  I I  probably  be  1.1%. 
(2)  EC  business surveys. ....  12-
Law  to safegyard competltlyeoess(1) 
1.  Criteria  for  assessing competitiveness 
- Changes  In  export  performances measured  on  the basis of  BLEU  gains 
or  losses  of  market  shares  compared  with  the  performances  of  the 
five malo  trading partners  In  the CommunitY; 
- Changes  In  wage  costs calcuiated on  the  basis of  the wage  cost  per 
person  emp I  oyed  >,~  ttte  !),- 1'  ~ te  sector,  ar~ressed  In  terms  of  a 
common  currency,  comparall  ·~It~  trn  we  lgot·~J  average  for  the  seven 
malo  trading  partners  (i,' :e  In  th&  c·)mmunlty  plus  the 
United  States and  Japan); 
- Changes  In  f I  nanc I  a I  costs  measured  Inter  a II a  on  the  bas Is  of 
movements  In  short-term,  medl~m-term and  long-term  Interest  rates 
In  Belgium  compared  with  the  situation  In  the  seven  malo  trading 
partners; 
-Changes  In  energy  costs  ftteasu.•  3,')  on  tht;  b4Sis  of  an  Indicator  of 
price  movements  for  e~c~  ener~y  product  znd  for  each  category  of 
consumers,  expressed  tn  ·erms  of  a  common  currency,  compared  with 
the situation  In  the  five malo  trading partners  In  the Community; 
-Changes  In  the structural  determinants of  competitiveness measured 
1  nter  a 1 1  a  on  the  bas 1  s  of  f 1  rms'  gross  fIxed  capIta I  format I  on 
and  R&D  expenditure  (a  distinction  being  drawn  between  public  and 
private  financing)  expressed  as  X of  GOP,  compared  with  the  five 
malo  trading partners  In  Europe. 
2.  Normal  orocedyre  for  assessing competitiveness 
The  Centra 1  Econom 1  c  Counc 1 I  prepares  each  year  an  InterIm  report 
(by  31  September)  and  a  final  report  (by  31  March)  on  the 
competitiveness  of  Belgian  firms.  These  reports  are  discussed  with 
the  two  sides  of  Industry,  which  have  one  month  In  which  to  adopt 
measures  to  safeguard  or  restore  competitiveness.  If,  on  expiry  of 
that  period,  the  Government  takes  the  view  that  competitiveness  Is 
still  threatened,  It  may  make  a  reasoned  statement  on  the  matter  to 
the  two  houses  of  parliament  . 
Competitiveness  Is  threatened  where  the  criterion  of  export 
performance  and  at  least  one  other  criterion  points  to  a  worsening 
In  the situation. 
3.  Procedyre  In  exceptional  circumstances 
In  the  case of external  developments,  Including a  sudden  upheaval  In 
exchange  rates,  whIch  are  expected  to  have  rapId  and  s I  go If I  cant 
effects  on  competitiveness,  the  Law  provides  for  an  emergency 
procedure  allowing  the  Government  to  Intervene. 
(1)  Monlteur  beige,  31  January  1989. -13-
4.  Instruments  for  safeguarding or  restoring cgmpetltlyeness 
The  King  Is  empowered  to  take  the  following  temporary  measures  once 
the  upper  and  lower  houses  of  Parliament  have  established  that  the 
competitiveness of Belgian  firms  Is  threatened: 
- the  factors  determining  the  nominal  growth  of earned  Income  not  to 
be  taken  fully  Into  account,  and  equivalent  moderatIon  for  the 
other categories of  Income; 
-establishment of  the  framework  for  any  agreement  on  adJustments  to 
earned  Income,  and  equivalent measures  for  the other  categories of 
Income; 
-adoption of  appropriate measures  for  reducing  financial  costs; 
-limited  reduction  In  employers'  social  security  contributions  In 
the  Industries exposed  to  International  competition; 
-Increase  In  tax  relief  for  Investment; 
-Increase  In  tax  relief for  R&D  Investment. 
• - 14-
2.4 Saying.  Investment  and  financial  balances 
The  resumptIon  of  growth  has  been  preceded  by  a  major 
redlstr I  but I  on  of  nat lonal  Income  In  favour  of  fIrms.  Our log  the 
1980s,  !lDmA'  savings  ratio  virtually  doubled  (see  Table 6).  This 
Initially  lead  to  a  corresponding  Increase  In  their  financial 
surplus,  the  resurgence  In  Investment  being  relatively  slow  to 
material lze.  One  explanation  for  this  delay  Is  the  fact  that 
managements  were  concerned  fIrst  and  foremost  wIth  overhau I I  ng 
their  financial  structures  as  a  result  of  the  particularly  high 
levels  of  debt  that  had  built  up  throughout  the  1970s.  Importance 
was  a I  so  attached  to  f I  nanc I  a I  Investments  gIven  the  hIgh  rea I 
Interest  rates  and  especially  the  continuing  relative  weakness  of 
demand,  at  least  untl I  1986.  An  analysis  of  firms'  balance  sheets 
(see  Table  8)  bears  witness  to  the  movements  In  the  macroeconomic 
Indicators: 
the  average  level  of  Indebtedness  In  Industry,  expressed  as  a 
proportion  of  equity  capital,  was  reduced  from  over  90%  at  the 
beginning of  the  1980s  to around  50%  In  1986  and  1987; 
the  share  of  financial  assets  In  the  balance-sheet  total  rose 
from  around  20%  to over  30%  In  1986-87. 
Since  1987,  however,  fixed  capital  Investment  by  firms  has  risen at 
an  annual  rate  of  some  10%-12%  In  volume  terms.  The  present  trend 
Is stl I I  very  firm  although  It  Is  slackening  a  little. 
The  financial  surplus of  households  has  fallen  significantly,  from 
1  OX  of  GOP  to  around  5%  1  n  1988.  ThIs  was  due  In It I  a I I  y  to  a 
reI at I  ve  reduct I  on  In  persona I  Income,  together  wIth  a  dec II ne  In 
the  savings  ratio  as  a  percentage  of  disposable  Income.  More 
recently,  personal-sector  Investments  have  shown  a  noticeable 
Increase. 
The  size of  the  publ lc  deficit  has  been  halved,  from  16%  of  GOP  In 
1981  to  8%  In  1988.  Until  1986,  this  resulted  In  a  corresponding 
Increase  In  national  saving.  In  recent  years,  however,  the nation's 
f I  nanc I  a I  ba I  ance  has  tended  to  dec I I  ne  a I though  It  contInues  to 
show  a  slight surplus. 
The  Increase  In  the  national  savings  ratio  and  the  remarkable 
recovery  In  the  financial  position of  businesses  have  paved  the way 
for  higher  Investment.  The  surplus  of  private  domestic  saving  over 
private  Investment  remains  substantial  (6.7 X of  GOP)  although  It 
has  been  narrowing  over  the  last  three years.  However,  considerable 
Investment  could  stIll  be  needed  In  the  Belgian  economy  In  the 
years  ahead  given  the  relatively  low  Investment  ratio  (18%  of  GOP) 
compared  with  other  European  countries  In  particular  (see Table  7) 
and  given  the  need  to  adapt  supply  In  the  run-up  to  the 
Community-wide  market  In  1992. T
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2.5 Balance of  Payments 
Whether  we  look  at  Belgium  (on  a  national  accounts  basis)  or  the 
Belgo-Luxembourg  Economic  Union  <on  a  balance-of-payments  basis), 
the  current-account  balance  has  Improved  significantly  during  the 
1980s.  The  BLEU  deficit,  equivalent  to  41  of  GOP  In  1980-81,  was 
eliminated  In  1984-85  (see Table 6)  and  annual  surpluses  of  the 
order  of  21-2.51  of  GOP  have  been  recorded  since.  For  Belgium 
alone,  the  current-account  surplus  Is  equivalent  to  some  11  of  GOP 
and,  accordIng  to  the  I  a test  forecasts,  Is  expected  to  be  of  a 
similar order of magnitude  In  1991  (see Table  1). 
The  performance  of  the  current  account  has  been  Influenced 
primarily  by  the  Improvement  In  the  trade  balance  (up  to  1988)  and 
by  a  continuing  surplus  In  1989  despite  the  faster  pace  of  Import 
prices and  the  high  level  of  Investment.  Certain  Indicators suggest 
that  a  real  Improvement  In  trade  performance  could  be  under  way. 
During  the  first  half  of  the  1980s,  the  reduction  In  the  deficit 
stemmed  first  and  foremost  from  the  weakness  of  domestic  demand. 
Since  then,  alongside an  Improvement  In  the  terms of  trade  In  1986, 
foreign  trade  has  been  Influenced  by  the  following  factors: 
the  continuation  of  a  relatively  favourable  level  of  price 
competItIveness  has  certaIn I  y  contrIbuted  to  a  better  export 
performance  and  has  doubtless benefited  the position of Belgian 
firms  on  the domestic market; 
the  composition  by  product  of  BLEU  exports  and  their 
geographical  breakdown,  which  had  been  serious handicaps  during 
the  1970s,  have  had  beneficial  effects  In  recent  years.  The 
expansion  In  BLEU's  market  shares  has  been  particularly  firm, 
possibly  because  of  two  factors:  more  buoyant  demand  for  Its 
main  products and  on  Its main  export markets,  and/or  a  shift  In 
production  towards  expanding  new  markets.  In  the  case  of 
Belgium,  both  factors  have  probably  been  at  work  although  the 
Industry  statistics  aval lable  do  not  capture  recent 
developments; 
an  analysis  of  a  number  of  structural  Indicators,  notably 
export  market  shares,  suggests  that  an  Improvement  Is under  way 
In  other  factors  of  competitiveness  following  the  major 
Investment  drive  In  recent  years. 
In  the  run-up  to  establishment  of  the  Internal  market,  Belgium  Is 
relatively  well  placed  In  that  Its  degree  of  openness  to 
Intra-Community  trade  Is  already  significant  (751  of  exports  and 
701  of  Imports)  and  Its  export  performance  In  those  lndustr les 
deemed  to  be  part lcular ly  responsive  to  the  1992  target  date  Is 
generally  satisfactory.  Even  so,  Belgian  Industry  has  serious 
weaknesses,  notably  In  rapidly  expanding  activities  such  as - 17  -
TABLE  6  BLEU  BALANCE  OF  PAYMENT~: (transact lon basis) 
(as % of  GOP) 
1.  Current aecount 
2.  Trade  b~l&nc~' 
3.  Serv1ee!!  and  'factor  ineoME< 
4.  lransfer!l 
!5.  Cap Hal  mov~~i1'.J 
6.  General  govar111'M!~t  (  ~ 'i: 
7.  Commerc111!  cr~dt~i>; 
8.  Public  ent•rpr~~ra•  d 
9.  Privata  2n'li.~trpr ·,1  \Ut~  ·i.  •nGJ  ~ndtvtduals 
Of  wh1cn .  porUoi1o  <nvasti'lllrt:lll'11':  . 
D1re~t  i m:~:i}  tfiimr-~  ·;: 
10.  Bank~~ !':''!~"1;1':'<; 
Of  which  :  filQn- r  ~,., t dtl'nt!l'  BFR  assets and ltabtlittes 
11.  Error• and  om'~~~~o~rii.;,.: 
12.  Countcrpil:r-t  of  (da~~netiz:~~tton of monetary gold 
13.  Chang~ in net  cff1c~al raserv.t~  (3) 
(1)  Includln~ foreign currency transactions wtth resident  cr~dt~ 
1nstituHons 
(2)  eMcludfng monetary  tnstttuttons 
(3)  increase  (+),  d•crease (-) 
Source  :  National Bank  of Belgium 
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Information  technology,  office electronics,  and  telecommunications, 
where  the  Belgian  market  Is  dominated  by  foreign  manufacturers.  In 
the  protected  sectors  that  will  be  concerned  by  the  opening-up  of 
government  procurement  such  as  railway  equipment  and  heavy 
electrical  plant,  the  small  size  of  Belgian  firms  could  be  a 
handicap.  Proper  sectoral  strategies are  essential  and  will  entail 
not  only  considerable  Investment  but  also  a  search  for  synergies 
with  other  European  firms,  whether  In  the  form  of  alI lances, 
mergers,  take-overs or  attempts  to attract plants  to Belgium. 
A  lasting  Improvement  In  the  BLEU's  trade  performance  would  be  all 
the  more  desirable  In  that  the  balance  on  serylces  and  factor 
Incomes  Is  unlikely  to  show  many  gains.  The  deficit  on  tourism  Is 
tending  to widen.  The  burden  of  servicing  the external  publ lc  debt, 
equivalent  to  just  under  2%  of  GOP  In  1985,  Is already much  I lghter 
as  a  result of  the  fal I  In  International  Interest  rates  In  1985-86 
but  also as  a  result  of  the  changes  In  debt  management.  Investment 
Income  Is  tending  to  grow  In  terms  of  flows  but  Is  still  showing 
only a  small  surplus. 
For  the  monetary  authorities,  the  maintenance  of  a  current-account 
surplus  Is  the  necessary  counterpart  to  the  propensity  to export  a 
proportIon  of  f I  nanc I  a I  savIng.  Net  outflows  of  pr I  yate  capIta I 
have  fluctuated  between  1%  and  3%  of  GOP  In  recent  years.  Alongside 
the  general  trend  towards  global lzatlon  of  portfol los  and  the 
growing  role  of  collect lve  Investment  undertakings  In  the 
channelling  of  saving,  tax  considerations,  and  In  particular  the 
withholding  tax  on  Investment  Income  (levied at  a  rate of  25%  untl I 
March  1990)  have  led  Investors  to  look  abroad.  As  regards  direct 
Investment,  flows  are  set  to  expand  given  the  move  towards 
International  Integration among  businesses. 
3.  PUBLIC  FINANCES 
3.1  Fiscal  adlustment  pol Icy 
The  publ lc  finance situation has  changed  markedly  since 1985.  Total 
expendIture  as  a  percentage  of  GOP  fe II  from  57%  to  some  51%  In 
1989;  total  revenue  was  slightly  reduced  from  47.5%  to  45%.  As  a 
result,  the  net  borrowing  requirement  fell  from  8,5%  to  6,3%  of 
GOP.  The  share  of  Interest  payments  In  current  expenditure  rose  to 
some  21%  In  1989  while  the  amount  of  outstanding  debt  reached  128% 
of  GOP. 
The  evolution  of  these  aggregates  Is  partially  related  to  the 
adjustment  measures  Implemented  dur lng  the  last  f lve  years.  In 
March  1984,  the  authorities  availed  themselves  of  their  remaining 
special  powers  to  formulate  a  new  three-year  fiscal  adjustment ~
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programme  with  the  aim  of  reducing  the  central  government  net 
financing  requirement  to  7%  of  GOP  by  1987.  The  adjustment 
programme  rested on  a  combination  of  wage  moderation  In  the  public 
sector  and  fiscal  measures  In  the private sector  (of  which  the main 
feature was  the suspension of  the first  Indexation  adjustment  of  2% 
In  1984,  1985  and  1987)  In  favour  of  the social  security system  and 
the  Treasury  ,  savIngs  In  expendIture  on  goods  and  servIces  and 
restrictions  affecting  social  transfers.  The  7%  target  first 
appeared  In  1982  as  an  objective  for  1985;  It  was  at  that  time  set 
to be  equal  to  the  assumed  growth  rate of  nominal  GOP  In  the medium 
term  and  was  Intended  to stabl lise  the  debt/GOP  ratio. 
By  the  end  of  1985,  however,  It  became  clear  that  the  target  set 
for  1987  again  would  be  overshot;  the  7%  objective was  pushed  back 
to  1989  and  a  new  fiscal  adjustment  package  - called  the  St.Anna 
programme- was  released  In  May  1986.  In  contrast  with  previous 
efforts,  the  programme  relied more  heavily on  expenditure  cuts  and 
contained only a  minor  set of  revenue-raising measures;  the  bulk of 
the  programme's  measures  were  Intended  to  take  effect  In  1987  In 
order  to  reach  an  Interim  deficit  target  of  some  8%  of  GOP.  The 
significant  cuts  In  social  expenditure  affected  unemployment 
compensation,  pensions,  health  care  and  education;  publ lc 
Investment  was  further  reduced  and  subsIdIes  to  pub I I  c  u t I I It I  es 
were  scaled  down.  The  St.Anna  programme  also  Introduced  an 
Important  new  form  of  debudgetlzatlon  through  the  creation  of 
special  eight-year  Treasury  bonds,  Issued  to  settle  part  of  the 
Interest  payments  on  publ lc  debt.  Such  "rescheduled"  Interest 
payments  do  not  appear  In  the  Treasury  deficit,  but  still  affect 
the  net  borrowing  requirement. 
The  Impact  of  the  programme  on  the  net  borrowing  requirement  was 
significant;  further  progress  through  new  policy  Initiatives  was 
hampered  by  the  long  pol ltlcal  crisis  of  1987-1988,  however, 
although  the unexpected  recovery of  economic  growth  and  the decl lne 
of  International  Interest  rates  had  a  positive  Impact  on  fiscal 
def lc Its. 
At  Its  formation  In  May  1988  the  new  government  reconfirmed  the  7% 
oblectlye  for  1989,  and  adopted  a  doyble  budget  norm  for  the medlym 
1Ar.m  (I.e.  from  1990  to  1992).  The  first  target  Is  to  stop  non-
Interest  expenditure growing  In  real  terms;  the second  requires  the 
treasury  deficit  not  to  Increase  from  one  year  to  the  next  In 
nominal  terms. 
With  an  actual  outturn of  6.8%,  the  1989  central  government  budget 
nominally  meets  the  7%  target,  but  a  heavy  resort  to 
debudgetlzatlon  and  shifting  of  expenditure  had  to  be  made.  The 
most  Important  budgetary  measure  Is  a  renewed  shIft  of  Interest -22-
charges  on  the  public  debt  (BEF  28  billion),  which  together  with 
other  expenditure  shifting  operations  makes  up  about  half  of  the 
required  savings  (78  bll lion).  The  same  remarks  hold  with  respect 
to  the  1990  draft  budget  which  Is  the first  that  has  to satisfy the 
dual  target strategy:  as  far  as measures  are actually known,  there 
wll I  be  no  substantial  Improvement  In  the  general  government 
borrowing  requirement  compared  to 1989. 
Fiscal  consol ldatlon  could  In  future  be  further  complicated  by  the 
1988  devolution  of  a  number  of  powers  to  the  communities  and  the 
regions;  the  expenditure  Involved  represents  roughly  one  third  of 
the Treasury's 1989  budget.  The  constituent parts of  the  federation 
have  not  been  granted  any  real  fiscal  autonomy;  Instead,  a  complex 
system of  Intergovernmental  transfers has  been  set  up,  some  detal Is 
of which  are explained  In  the  appendix.  The  amounts  transferred are 
Insufficient  to  cover  the  expenses  of  the  regions  and  communities, 
Implying  that  Central  Government  has  decentrallsed  part  of  Its 
deficit  to  the  federal  entitles. 
A  remarkable  phenomenon  In  this  context  Is  the  fact  that  the 
outturn  of  the  1989  Treasury  deficit  (397  bl I I lon  BEF  which 
consol ldates  the  balances  of  Central  government,  Regions  and 
Communities)  has  been  realised  despite  the  fact  that  several  ten 
billions  BEF  which  had  to  be  transferred  In  that  year  to  the 
Reg Ions  and  CommunI t les  Is  stIll  due  by  the  Centra I  Government. 
Consequent I  y,  these  federa I  entItIes  have  managed  to  exert  theIr 
powers  without  these  amounts  and  nevertheless  have  broadly  met 
theIr  own  defIcIt  target.  If  these  amounts  are  transferred  durIng 
the  current  year  - as  they  legally  should - It  Is  by  no  means 
evident  that  Regions  and  Communities  will  use  them  to  generate 
surpluses  Instead of  running  Into additional  spending. 
3.2 Taxation  col lcles 
Until  1985  the  boom  In  expenditure  was  partly  financed  by  a  steady 
rIse  In  revenue,  more  spec If I  ca II y  through  rIsIng  Income  taxes. 
S I  nee  Income  tax  thresho Ids  were  not  automat I  ca I I  y  adjusted  for 
Inflation,  the  average  tax  rate  rose strongly  In  these  years. 
A  first  Important  downward  adjustment  was  voted  In  August  1985. 
Over  a  period of  four  years,  the  minimum  Income  subject  to  tax  was 
raised,  tax  thresholds  were  linked  to  the  consumer  prIce  Index, 
marginal  tax  rates  were  lowered  and  the  fiscal  position of  married 
couples was  Improved. 
A second  reform  of  personal  taxation  came  Into  effect  on  January 
1989.  It  Is  expected  to  lower  Income  taxes  for  Individuals  by  some 
BEF  91  billion  on  a  gross  basis.  Basic  principles  underlying  the 
reform  are  a  cut  In  the  number  of  marginal  tax  rates  from  13  to 7, 
a  lowering  of  the  top  rate  from  72  to  55  percent,  the  extension of 
the  Indexation  to  all  amounts  contained  In  tax  legislation,  and  a 
modification of  the  fiscal  treatment  of married  couples  (one-earner 
as well  as  two-earner). -23-
Given  the  difficult  budgetary  situation,  the  reform  has  from  the 
start  been  conceived  to  be  neutral  with  respect  to  government 
revenue.  Consequently,  half  of  the  91  billion  will  be  recovered 
through  lower  deductions  and  exemptions  both  In  personal  and  In 
corporate  tax.  The  rest  Is  mainly  made  up  through  significant 
Increases  In  excise duties and  the  Induced  VAT  Increases. 
The  Increase  In  excise  duties  can  be  considered  to  be  an 
ant I  c I  pat I  on  of  the  harmon I  sat I  on  of  IndIrect  tax at I  on  whIch  Is 
currently  under  discussion  at  the  Community  level.  Broadly 
speaking,  Belgian  excise  dutleswere  relatively  low  whl  le  VAT  rates 
were  too  high. 
Commission  estimates  of  the  budgetary  Impact  of  harmonisation 
proposals  suggested  that  the  loss  Implied  by  the  lowering  of  VAT 
rates  would  be  compensated  for  by  the  Increase  In  excise  duties. 
Since  the  upward  adjustment  In  excise  duties  has  been  used  for  the 
major  part  to  finance  the  personal  Income  tax  reform,  future 
harmonisation of  VAT  rates wl  I I  Imply  a  significant  loss of  revenue 
of  about  0,7%  of  GOP. 
The  same  budgetary  constraint  appl led  to  the  problem  of  the 
downward  adjustment  of  the withholding  tax  on  Income  from  savings, 
which  took  effect  on  March  1  1990  In  order  to  cope  with  the 
Integration  of  capital  markets.  Although  the  reduction  had  long 
been  considered  necessary  from  a  pol Icy  point  of  view,  the  problem 
of  the  negative  Impact  on  tax  revenues  was  a  serious  Impediment. 
Taxation  of  enterprises  has  been  modified  several  times  during  the 
eight les  to  reconcile  budgetary  needs  with  Investment-at lmulat lng 
measures.  As  a  result,  corporate  taxation  has  become  very  complex 
and  the  reI at I  on  between  the  nomIna I  tax  rate  of  43%  and  the 
effective rate  Is very difficult  to assess.  The  opening of  Internal 
market  frontiers  has  consequently  led  the government  to express  Its 
Intention  to add  to  the  reform of  personal  Income  tax  a  fundamental 
revIsIon  of  corporate  taxatIon,  whIch  among  other  thIngs  shou I  d 
simplify  It  substantially,  make  It  more  transparent  and  lower 
substantIa II y  the  nomIna I  rate.  The  government  has  enforced  thIs 
Intention  by  already  deciding  to  lower  the  rate  to  41%  In  1990  and 
to  39%  In  1991,  as  a  partial  compensation  for  the  abolition  of 
certain  tax  deductions. -24-
3.3 process of  regional  deyolytlon  and  financing  arrangements 
The  current  phase  of  Institutional  reform  has  Its roots  In  the  1971 
revision of  the  constitutional  law,  at  which  time  the  principle of 
three  regions  (Flanders,  Wallonia  and  Brussels)  and  three 
communities  (French,  Dutch  and  German  speaking)  was  Introduced, 
each  having  a  limited  number  of  Institutions  and  competences.  The 
1980  reform  added  a  number  of  additional  Institutions  and 
competences  to  the  exIstIng  ones  and  broadened  theIr  f I  nanc I  a I 
powers. 
In  the  logic of  this system,  each  community  and  each  region  has  Its 
own  parliamentary  assembly  (Council)  and  Its  own  government 
(Execut lve)  and  admlnlstrat lon.  In  practIce,  however,  there  are 
only  five  assemblies,  governments  and  administrations,  since  the 
councils  and  executives  of  the  Flemish  Region  and  Community  are 
organ I  sed  and  managed  as  one  entIty.  In  Brusse Is,  there  are  In 
addition  three  .. subcommunities  ..  each  having  their  own  .. commission ... 
The  fal I  of  the  cabinet  In  1987  over  I lngulstlc  matters  made 
apparent  the  need  to  add  a  more  decisive  phase  to  the  regional 
devolutIon  process.  In  August  1988,  new  leglslat lon  was  passed 
devolving  education  to  the  communities;  the  regions  gained 
competence  over  I nfrastructre  po II cy,  reg lona I  transport  networks 
(excluding  railways),  export  policy,  regional  aspects  of  energy, 
employment  pol Icy,  housing,  provinces  and  municipalities,  and 
environmental  protection.  Regions  also  became  responsible  for 
economic  policy  (Including  the  five  sectors  which  In  the  1980 
reform  remained  national  steel,  textIles,  glass,  shipyards, 
coalmlnes)  except  for  those  matters  expl lcltly  attributed  to 
central  government  :monetary  policy,  financial  policy,  prices  and 
Incomes,  competition pol Icy,  etc .. Central  government  has  also kept 
the  sole  responslbl llty  for  social  security  and  for  the  service of 
the outstanding national  debt. 
Overall,  the  total  amounts  Involved  represent  about  one  third  of 
expenditure  of  central  government  before  devolution;  regions 
receive about  60%  of  this total. 
The  financing  mechanisms  accompaylng  the  reform  are  complex;  they 
have  been  dealt  with  In  a  separate special  law  of  16/01/89(1).  The 
law  Is  special  In  the  sense  that  a  majority  of  two  thirds  Is 
required  In  both  chambers,  together  with  a  simple  majority  In  each 
I lngulstlc group  of each  chamber. 
(1)  It  Is  to  be  remembered  that  the  smal I  German  Community  (which  has 
no  powers  with  respect  to  education)  will  be  dealt  with  In  a 
separate  law. 
• -25-
The  different  financing  mechanism  wll I  not  be  dealt  with  In  detail 
but  a  survey  of  some  of  the  most  Important  features  wl  II  be  useful 
to assess  the general  concept.  The  complexity of  the overal I  system 
results  from  the  combination  In  five  different  submechanlsms, 
Intended  to  cover  I)  transfers  for  education  (communities), 
I I)  cur rent  expendIture  on  new  powers  of  the  reg Ions  (exc I  ud I  ng 
mun I  c I  pa I It I  es  and  provInces) ,  1  1  I )  Investment  expend 1  ture  on  new 
powers  of  the  reg Ions,  I  v)  the  Mun I  c I  pa II tIes  and  ProvInces  Fund 
(regions)  and  v>  expenditure  on  new  powers  of  the  communities 
together  wIth  expendIture  for  exIstIng  powers  of  communItIes  and 
regions  (previous allocations). 
A  fIrst  pr Inc I  pIe  has  been  to  fInance  reg Ions  as  a  functIon  of 
theIr  contrIbutIon  to  the  over  a II  persona 1  Income  tax  y I  e I  d  :  In 
the  final  system,  the  contribution  of  a  region  to  total  personal 
Income  tax  yield  will  determine  Its  share  of  the  total  amount  of 
money  transferred  to  the  regions  as  a  whole.  Since  the  present 
distribution of  expenditure on  the  Items  that  have  been  devolved  to 
the  regions  Is  not  -or only  partially- based  on  this  principle, 
an  eleyen-year  transition  cerlod  has  been  Introduced  which  will 
serve  to adjust  gradually  amounts  transferred. 
Apart  from  the  distribution basis,  the  total  amount  of  money  to  be 
transferred  to  the  regions  and  communities  has  to  be  determined. 
Here  the  basic  principle  Is  that  calculations  should  be  based  on 
what  central  government  would  have  spent  on  the  devolved  Items  In 
the  absence  of  devolut lon.  The  calculatIons  start  off  from  the 
amounts  related  to  devolved  Items  In  the  original  1989  central 
government  budget.  Since  the  current  government  has  constrained 
non-Interest  expendIture  to  grow  no  faster  than  I  nf I  at I  on,  thIs 
same  rule  Is  appl led  to determine  the  total  transfer  untl I  1999.  In 
the  final  stage,  however,  the  amount  to  be  distributed  will  not 
only  be  corrected  for  Inflation,  but  also  for  real  GOP  growth. 
With  respect  to  expenditure  on  education,  an  additional  correction 
Is  applied  to  take  account  of  the  evolut lon  of  the  number  of 
pupl Is,  because  It  Is  assumed  that  this  evolution  would  have 
equally  Influenced  the  amount  spent  In  the  national  budget  In  the 
absence  of  devolution.  For  the  next  ten  years,  the  result  will  be 
divided  between  the  Flemish  and  French  Community  In  the  proportion 
57.55%  to  42.45%.  Afterwards,  the  relative  distribution  of  pupils 
wl  I I  determine  the  proportion. 
The  devolution  process  Is  based  on  the  principle  of  financial 
respons I  b I I I ty,  Imp I  y I  ng  that  reg Ions  and  communItIes  can 
autonomously  decide  how  to  spend  their  revenues  -notwithstanding 
the  fact  that  the  calculation  of  the  amounts  to  be  transferred  Is 
based  on  predictions  of  the  evolution  of  certain  expenditure 
categories. -26-
Next,  regions  are  allowed  to  a  certain extent  to conduct  their  own 
taxation  oollcy.  Indeed,  apart  from  a  small  number  of  taxes  which 
become  regional,  regions  are  allowed  to  levy  surtaxes or  grant  tax 
reductions with  respect  to personal  tax  revenues  collected on  their 
territory.  However,  In  order  to prevent  distortions of  the  Economic 
and  Monetary  Union  of  the  nation,  central  government  could  Impose 
maxima  or  minima  In  this respect.  Taxation  policy,  both  at  regional 
and  at  nat I  on a I  I  eve I ,  w  I I 1  be  d I  scussed  I  n  the  Consu I tat I  ve 
Structure Central  Government  -Regional  Executives. 
The  principle  of  Interregional  solidarity  Is  maintained  and 
formalised.  If  tax  revenues  per  head  In  one  region  are  below  the 
nat lona I  average,  a  so I I  dar I  ty  transfer  Is  ca I  cuI a ted  whIch  Is  a 
function  of  this  discrepancy.  In  the  transitional  period  the 
solidarity  transfer  will  be  paid  for  by  the  regions;  In  the  final 
financing  mechanism  changes  In  the  solidarity  transfer  will  be 
payed  for  by  the central  budget. 
Next,  the  Idea  Is  Introduced  that  regions  and  communities  should 
during  the  eleven-year  transitional  period  bear  part  of  the 
adlustment  burden  of  public  finances.  Two  mechanisms  are  provided 
to  take  account  of  this  purpose.  The  first  concerns  the 
determination  of  the  basic  amounts  to  be  distributed;  as  has  been 
mentioned  before,  no  real  growth  Is  taken  Into account. 
The  second  mechanism  Is more  complex.  The  basic  Idea  Is  that  In  the 
absence  of  devolution,  central  government  would  have  had  to  borrow 
to  make  possible  expenditure  on  devolved  Items,  since  overall 
revenues  are  Insufficient.  This  Insufficiency  ratio  Is estimated  to 
be  14.3X.  Consequently,  for  devolved  current  expenditure  (excluding 
education  transfers)  only  85.7X  Is  transferred  to  the  regions  and 
communities,  forcing  them  either  to cut  back  expenditure or- as  Is 
the  Intention- to borrow. 
However,  Central  government  wl  II  share  In  servicing  the debt,  again 
for  an  amount  of  85.7X  (100%  for  expenditure  related  to  existing 
powers)  through  annuities  calculated  over  a  period  of  nine  or  ten 
years  and  based  on  the  rate of  Interest of  the  first  state  loan  of 
the year. 
With  respect  to  devolved  expenditure  Items  related  to  Investment, 
the  Insufficiency  ratio  Is  set  at  100X.  Again,  regional  entitles 
will  have  to  borrow,  but  will  enjoy  a  part lclpat lon  of  85.7%  by 
central  government  In  debt  servicing  through  the  system  of  a  ten-
year  annuity. 
The  principle  of  a  distribution  scheme  based  on  the  regions' 
contribution  to  national  personal  tax  revenue  Is  gradually 
Introduced  during  the  transitional  period.  This  wl II,  however, 
Imply  that  a  region  could  gain or  lose  compared  to what  would  have 
been  spent  In  the  region  In  the  absence  of  devolution.  For  some 
expenditure  Items  this  was  not  considered desirable.  Consequently, )) 
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the  total  amount  of  money  to  be  transferred  Is  augmented,  so  that, 
after  applying  the  distribution  scheme,  the  potential  loser  has 
neutralised  his  loss.  The  other  regions  have,  however,  received 
more  than  they  would  have  In  the  absence  of  this  compensation 
poI Icy.  The  amount  gaIned  Is  ca I I  ed  a  .. bon I'',  whereas  the  system  as 
such  Is  common I  y  referred  to as  the  ''Moureaux-key ...  The  expendIture 
Items  concerned  are  the  Initial  allocations  (which  date  from  the 
prev lous  const I tut lona I  reform)  and  the  allocatIons  to  provInces 
and  municipal I ties. 
Regions  and  communities  are allowed  to borrow  on  domestic  financial 
markets  In  BEE.  A consulting  procedure  to  harmonize  public  Issues 
with  the  Issue  calendar  of  the  Treasury  Is  Imposed;  private 
borrowing  Is  not  subject  to  any  constraint.  With  respect  to 
borrowing  In  foreign  currencies  or  In  BEF  abroad,  the  prior 
agreement  of  the  national  Minister of  Finance  Is  required. 
A  new  commission  Is  establ lshed  which  should  advise  central 
government  with  respect  to  the  evolution  of  the  borrowing 
requirement  of  total  government.  If  Internal  or  external 
equlllbr lum  Is  threatened,  the  monetary  union  of  the  nat ion  Is 
endangered  or  a  structural  disruption of  the  borrowing  requirement 
Is  I lkely,  It  may  advise  that  the  lending capacities of  regional  or 
community  governments  be  restricted.  The  Council  of  Ministers  can 
accordingly,  for  a  period  of  two  years,  subject  any  lending  to 
prior  agreement. 
3.4  Eyalyatlon and  Prospects 
3.4.1.  ~ses~nt of the  current  fiscal  policy targets 
The  ana 1  ys 1  s  of  the  pub 1 1  c  f 1  nance  prob 1  em  1  n  the  Be I  g I  an 
context  has  In  recent  years  almost  exclusively  been  conducted 
In  terms  of  .. halting  the  snowball ...  The  snowball  Image  refers 
to  the  problem  of  explosive  public  debt  growth  caused  by  the 
accumulation  of  Interest  payments.  If  the  primary  deficit-
I.e.  the  deficit  excluding  Interest  payments- Is  not  well 
contained,  the  ratio of  public debt/GOP  wl  I I  keep  rising  If  the 
rate  of  growth  of  GOP  Is  smaller  than  the  average  rate  of 
Interest  on  the  debt. 
HaItI ng  the  snowba I I  consequent I  y  means  attaInIng  a  I  eve I  of 
primary  deficit  which  Is  sufficient  to ensure  that  In  the  next 
period  total  debt  wll I  not  grow  more  than  GOP. 
The  snowba II  Image  has  the  merIt  of  exp I  a In I  ng  some  of  the 
Internal  dynamics  of  current  expenditure,  by  pointing  to  the 
Impossibility of  compressing  one  of  Its  components,  namely  the 
Interest  payments.  HaItI ng  the  snowba I I,  however,  Is  nothIng 
more  than  the  objective of  stabll lzlng  the  debt/GOP  ratio.  The 
dIsadvantage  of  ta I  kIng  In  terms  of  haItI ng  the  snowba II  Is 
that  the  objectIve  of  reducIng  the  debt/GOP  rat lo  cannot  be 
dealt  with  In  this framework. -28-
The  Interest  accumulation  framework  also  Introduces  the  concept 
of  the  primary  balance,  which  In  the  Belgian  case  shows  a 
remarkable  evolution  from  a  serious  deficit  (-4,8X  of  GOP  In 
1981)  to  a  significant  surplus  (+4,3X  In  1989).  As  such,  It 
well  I I lustrates  the  remarkable  result  of  past  adjustment 
policies;  nevertheless,  the  concept  does  not  allow  to  assess 
the  actual  nor.  the  future  stance  of  publ lc  finance,  In 
part lcular  If  the  ex 1st lng  stock  of  government  debt  Is  taken 
Into account. 
The  government  has  added  to  this  medium-term  objective  of 
haItI ng  the  Interest  payments  snowba II  two  strategIc  targets 
from  1990  on.  The  first  target  -no rise  In  real  non-Interest 
expenditure- Indicates  that  the  authorities  want  every  new 
Initiative or  Increase  In  expenditure  to  be  compensated  for  on 
the  expenditure  side.  The  second  target  -no  rise  In  the 
nominal  deficit - constrains  the  accumulation  of  debt  and 
consequently  requires  additional  cut-backs  In  non-Interest 
expenditure  or  an  Increase  In  revenues  If  Interest  charges 
exceed  the  current  pr lmary  surplus  by  more  than  last  year's 
total  deficit. 
Although  the  dual  target  strategy  Is  a  pol ltlcal  commitment  to 
the end  of  1992  (I.e.  the end  of  the  normal  period of office of 
the  current  government),  the  stabilisation  of  the  debt-to-GOP 
ratio  has  already  been  achieved  In  1989,  due  to  the  strenght 
and  so I I  dness  of  economIc  growth.  Consequent I  y,  a  fa I I  In 
growth  performance  could  easily  cause  a  renewed  Increase  In 
this  ratio  unless  a  further  reduction  In  the  yearly  deficit 
wou I  d  have  been  obtaI ned  In  the  meant I  me.  Of  course,  In  the 
long  run  the  second  constraint  wl  I I  In  the  end  result  In 
stabilizing  the  ratio  If  average  nominal  growth  of  nominal  GOP 
remains  positive. 
Next,  meetIng  one  target  (for  Instance  the  rea I  expendIture 
one)  might- but  would  not  automatically- lead  to better  than 
reQuired  performance  with  respect  to  the other.  This  one  could 
then  become  binding  as  an  upper  limit  next  year  and  might 
consequently  Induce  a  downward  adjustment  that  was  stronger 
than  expected  at  first  sight.  The  Interaction  of  both 
constraints consequently  ~ould yield much  stronger  results  than 
foreseen  at  the moment  of  their  conception. 
A  basic  problem  with  objectives  formulated  as  percentages  of 
GOP  (whether  they  refer  to  a  deficit  or  the  level  of  debt)  Is 
that  they  are  procycllcal  by  definition.  In  periods  of 
accelerating  nominal  growth  they  relax  the  necessary  effort  to 
attain  the  goal  that  Is  get;  this  has  been  the  case  In  Belgium 
In  1989,  when  a  goal  of  7X  was  set. -29-
It  could  be  argued  that  a  norm  should  be  counter-cyclical,  thus 
strenghtenlng  fiscal  consolidation  In  periods  of  strong 
economic  growth.  The  dual-target  strategy  avoids  any  direct 
relation  to  GOP,  but  It  Is  clear  that  the  drafting of  the  1990 
budget  would  have  been  more  difficult  If  current  prospects were 
less bright. 
Of  course,  the positive effect of  growth  on  revenues  should  not 
be  overestImated;  recent  est lmates  seem  to  suggest  that  the 
elasticity  of  fiscal  receipts  with  respect  to  GOP  Is 
decreasing. 
3.4.2.  s~  probl~ ln assesslng the  consolldatlon results 
The  dual-target  strategy  Is  formulated  with  respect  to  the 
treasury  deficit,  thus  excluding  social  security  and  local 
government.  However,  It  has  been  longstanding  practice  In 
Belgian  pol I tics  to  resort  to  debydgetlsatlon  of  central 
government  expenditure. 
In  the  early  eighties,  payments  were  generally  deferred  by 
means  of  preflnanclng  operation,  carried  out  by  autonomous 
pub II c  sector  funds.  More  recent I  y,  the  practIce  of  "Interest 
rescheduling"  has  become  operational.  As  mentioned  before,  the 
system  works  through  an  reconversion  of  part  of  the  due 
Interest  payments  on  I  ongterm  debt  Into  so-c  a I I  ed  ••Treasury-
bonds".  The  system,  which  had  to  be  the  subject  of  a  protocol 
agreement  with  the  domestic  financial  sector  which  holds  these 
assets,  causes  the  deferred  Interest  payments  to disappear  from 
the  central  government  Treasury  deficit.  The  net  borrowing 
reQuirement  Is  nevertheless unaffected.  Although  at  the  time of 
Its  creatIon  In  1986  conceIved  to  be  a  one-tIme  operatIon 
(affecting  successive  years)  the  Interest  deferment  system  has 
been  used  an  additional  two  times since  then;  both  the  1989  and 
the  1990  budget  make  extensive use of  lt. 
TABLE  9  DEFERMENT  OF  INTEREST  PAYMENTS 
(b II lions  BEF) 
1986  1987  1988  1989 
Treasury  bonds  creation 
1986  agreement  6,0  33,1  35,2  21 ,0 
1988  agreement  28,0 
1989  agreement 
Total  6,0  33,1  35,2  49,0 
As  X of  Treasury deficit  1 '1  7,7  8'  1  12,2 
(for  1990  :  budget) 
1990 
11,0 
20,0 
31,0 
7,7 -30-
3.4.3  The  effect  of the  1988  constltuttonal  refonn on  flscal  conso-
lidation 
An  unresolved  question  of  high  Importance  Is  the  effect  of  the 
constitutional  reform  on  fiscal  consolidation.  (Details  on  the 
transfer  of  powers  and  on  the  complex  financing  mechanism  can 
be  found  In  appendix  IV). 
Reduced  to  Its  bare  essent I  a Is  - and  thus  sImp II fy I  ng  - the 
fInancIng  I  aw  transfers  IncreasIng  amounts  of  money  to  the 
regions,  which  during  the  first  years  of  the  transitional 
period  wl  I I  be  Insufficient  to  cover  expenses,  even  under  the 
assumption  that  these  expenses  do  not  grow  faster  than 
Inflation.  After  1995,  under  the  same  hypothesis,  transfers 
wll I  exceed  projected  expenses.  As  a  consequence,  regions  will 
have  to  borrow  considerably  during  the  first  period  -or  cut 
back  expenses  - and  wl  1 I  run  surpluses  afterwards  If  they 
maintain  zero  real  growth  of  expenditure.  After  1999  (the  end 
of  the  transition period)  transfers  to  the  regions  wl  I I  grow  In 
I ine  with  nominal  GOP. 
With  respect  to  the  1 lngulstlc  communities,  transfers  for 
education  (I .e.  the  larger  part of  their  responslbl I I ties)  wl  I I 
be  made  as  a  function  of  the  number  of  young  people  under  18 
and  wl  II  be  adjusted  for  Inflation.  Other  devolved  expenditure 
to  the  communities  will  be  financed  In  an  analogous  way  to  the 
regions. 
A  first  Important  feature  from  the  point  of  view  of  fiscal 
pol Icy  Is  that  reglonallsatlon  Involves  a  long-term  commitment 
from  central  government  to  transfer  Increasing  amoynts  of  money 
to other  political  entitles.  Although  the  calculation of  these 
transfers  has  been  based  on  restr let lve  grounds  - especially 
during  the  first years- they  Involve  nevertheless an  amount  of 
expenditure  which  has,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  central 
government,  some  of  the characteristics of  the  Interest  payment 
component  they  keep  growing  and  do  not  allow any  reduction. 
Moreover,  regional  authorities do  not  haye  to contribute  to  the 
servlclna of  the  existing  national  debt  :  neither  amortization 
nor  Interest  payments.  As  a  consequence,  central  government  has 
the  so  1  e  respons I  b I II ty  for  servIcIng  past  debt;  s I  nee  the 
I  arger  part  of  expendIture  cannot  be  compressed,  add It I  on a I 
consolldat ion  efforts  would  Imply  very  strong  falls  In  real 
non-Interest  expenditure  of  the  central  government  or 
significant  Increases  In  tax  pressure.The  1990  cent~al 
government  draft  budget  confirms  this view  :  the  heavy  recourse 
to  debudgetlsatlon  and  hence  the  non-attainment  of  the  target 
was  justified by  this reduced  mass  of  compressible expenditure. -31-
At  the  regional  and  community  level,  It  Is  Important  to  note 
that  no  budgetary  norm  has  been  devolved,  nor  has  the  central 
government  the  power  to  Impose  In  the  future  any  target  for 
fiscal  policy  on  the  regions  or  communities.  In  this  respect, 
It  Is  to  be  remembered  that  regions  and  communities  from  a 
JurI d I  ca I  poInt  of  vIew  cannot  be  cons I  de red  to  be  loca I  or 
subordinate  entitles.  As  a  consequence,the  behaviour  of 
regional  authorities  In  this  respect  Is  unknown  and 
uncontrollable;  In  fact,  there  Is  no  built-In  Incentive  for 
them  to avoid  running deficits or  to create surpluses. 
In  addition,  the  system  of  annuities  through  which  the  central 
government  participates  for  the  major  part  In  the  debt  service 
of  regions  and  communities  could  stimulate  their  non-Interest 
expenditure,  since  there  Is  no  obi lgatlon  for  them  to use  these 
amounts  to  service  their  debt.  The  same  holds  with  respect  to 
the  system  of  the  bonuses,  through  which  for  two  regions  more 
Is  transferred  than  actually needed. 
It  Is  virtually  Impossible  to  quant lfy  the  effect  of  the  new 
financing  mechanism  on  the  evolution  of  total  debt.  Many 
Important  parameters  are  uncertain  :  the  rate  of  growth  and 
Inflation;  future  population growth;  the  budgetary  targeting of 
central  government  and  regional  entitles  etc.  Given  these 
difficulties,  In  a  recent  study  publ lshed  by  the  National  Bank 
of  Belgium,  an  attempt  has  been  made  to calculate mechanically 
the  evolutIon  of  total  debt  over  a  per lod  of  twenty  years, 
under  different  scenarios  and  behavioural  assumptions  (see 
box). 
An  Important  conclusion  that  can  be  drawn  from  this exercise  Is 
that  even  In  the  most  restrictive  system,  I.e.  the  first 
hypothesis  of  scenario  one,  In  which  In  fact  the  regional  and 
communIty  entItIes  app I  y  an  expendIture  norm  whIch  Is  more 
stringent  than  the  zero  real  growth  rate of  central  government, 
the  process  of  budgetary  consolidation  Is  slowed  down  compared 
to  the one  under  the  hypothesis of  no  devolution. -32-
The  Impact  of  regional  deyolutlon on  total  debt(1) 
The  evolution of  total  debt  In  the  absence  of  devolution  Is  compared  to 
the  one  which  results  from  the  appl !cation  of  the  finance  taw.  A 
constant  rate of  real  growth  (2,1%),  Inflation  rate  (2,4%)  and  Interest 
rates  (8%  long  term  and  7%  short  term)  are  common  to all  scenarios.  The 
difference  between  scenarios  Is  the  assumption  with  respect  to  the 
behaviour  of  policy  entitles,  I.e.  central  government  and  regional  and 
communIty  governments.  The  fIrst'  scenar lo  assumes  an  unchanged 
expenditure policy over  the  period.  In  the  second one  expenditure policy 
of  each entity  Is  unchanged  until  their  debt  Is eliminated;  afterwards a 
ba I  anced  budget  Is  a lmed  at.  The  thIrd  scenar lo  assumes  an  unchanged 
expenditure  policy  until  balance  Is  reached,  which  will  be  maintained 
afterwards. 
Unchanged  pol Icy  means  for  central  government  no  Increase  In  real 
expendIture,  Interest  payments  exc I  uded.  RegIons  and  communItIes  are 
assumed  to change  real  spending,  Interest  payments  excluded,  by: 
Assymptlon  1.  -0.8%  for  education  and  0%  for  the  remaining  powers 
"  2.  0.0%  for  all  powers 
"  3.  +1.0%  for  at I  powers 
The  results  for  the  evolution  of  debt  as  a  percentage  of  GOP  for  the 
three scenarios under  the  three expenditure  assumptions  are shown  below: 
ScaDi~[ Ia  l 
WIthout  As sump- As sump- As sump-
devolution  tlon 1  t I  on  2  tlon 3 
1989  115.8  115.9  115.9  115.9 
1990  117.7  118.2  118.3  118.4 
1991  119.1  120.1  120.2  120.5 
1992  119.6  121.2  121 .5  122.1 
1993  119.5  121 .6  122.0  123.0 
1994  118.7  121 .3  121.9  123.4 
2007  56.0  62.7  68.7  85.8 
2008  47.1  53.9  60.6  79.7 
(1)  Claeys  J.,  and  Fameree  H.,  "La  lot  spectate  du  16  Janvier  1989 
relative au  flnancement  des  Communautes  et  des  Regions",  Cabler  N"3, 
j u I I I  e t  1989 . -33-
Scacarla  2 
WIthout  As sump- As sump- As sump-
devolut lon  tlon  1  tlon  2  t I  on  3 
1989  115.8  115.9  115.9  115.9 
1990  117.7  118.2  118.3  118.4 
1991  119.1  120.1  120.2  120.5 
1992  119.6  121.2  121 .5  122.1 
1993  119.5  121 .6  122.0  123.0 
1994  118.7  121.3  121 .9  123.4 
2007  56.0  72.5  75.2  88.6 
2008  47.1  65.3  68.3  83.0 
scacarla  3 
WIthout  As sump- As sump- As sump-
devolution  t lon  1  t I  on  2  t I  on  3 
1989  115.8  115.9  115.9  115.9 
1990  117.7  118.2  118.3  118.4 
1991  119.1  120.1  120.2  120.5 
1992  119.6  121.2  121 .5  122.1 
1993  119.5  121.7  122.0  123.0 
1994  118.7  121 .4  121 .9  123.4 
2007  74.4  81.6  84.4  97.1 
2008  71.2  78.0  81.1  95.0 -34-
4.  MONETARY  POLICY 
4.1  Introduction 
One  of  the  distinctive  features  of  monetary  policy  In  Belgium  <now 
In  the  process  of  change,  see  section  4.3  below)  has  been  Its 
rei lance  on  a  single  Instrument,  Interest  rates.  The  two-tier 
exchange  market  had  not  been  actively  used  since  the  1982 
devaluation,  and  was  finally  abolished  In  Uarch  1990  ;  and  changes 
In  monetary  and  credit  aggregates are not  a  factor  Influencing  the 
direction of  monetary  policy.  This  Is  because  the  authorities  have 
always  taken  the  view  that,  In  a  very  open  economy  such  as  that  of 
Belgium,  the  relationship between  exchange  rate movements  and  price 
movements  Is  more  stable  than  that  between  changes  In  a  particular 
aggregate  and  the  rate of  Inflation.  Indeed,  due  to  the  Importance 
of  International  trade  to  the  Belgian  economy  (exports  and  Imports 
each  amount  to more  than  70~ of  GOP)  a  strong  relation  Is  observed 
between  the  evolution of  the  domestic  price  level  and  the  exchange 
rate,  wh I I  e  the  freedom  of  capIta I  movements  Is  vIewed  as  makIng 
the  relation  between  a  monetary  aggregate  and  Inflation  less 
reliable. 
As  a  consequence  of  thIs  dependence  on  a  sIng I  e  Instrument  the 
conduct  of  monetary  poI Icy  In  Be I  g I  um  has  often  faced  a  d I I  emma 
between  a  domestic  objective  and  an  external  objective.  The 
external  objective  Is  the stabl I lty of  the Belgian  franc's exchange 
rate  within  the  EMS,  the  domest lc  object lve  being  to  lighten  the 
publ lc  debt  burden  and  to promote  productive  Investment  by  firms  In 
so  far  as  domestic  conditions  are  appropriate.  Monetary  policy  was 
then  directed  at  keeping  Interest  rates  at  the  lowest  possible 
level  compatible with  the  EMS  constraint. 
In  recent  years,  the  stance  of  exchange  rate  policy  has  gradually 
shifted  In  the  direction  of  stability  vis-a-vis  the  strong 
currencies  In  the  EMS.  This  option  has  been  reflected  In  the 
Interest  rate  differential  relative  to  Germany  which  has  been 
following  a  steadier  path  for  some  two  years  now.  The  authorities 
pub! !ely committed  themselves  to  the strong currency option  In  June 
1990. 
4.2  Exchange  rate and  Interest  rates 
The  Belgian  franc's  position  In  the  EMS  has  progressively 
strengthened  since  1984.  Whereas  Its  ecu  central  rate  fel I  by  12% 
between  1979  and  1983,  It  has  since  shown  an  overal I  appreciation 
of  some  5.5~.  An  Increasingly  tight  exchange-rate  pol Icy  has 
resulted  In  Increasingly  small  rates  of  devaluation  against  the 
German  mark.  For  Instance,  on  the  occasIon  of  the  most  recent 
realignment  In  January  1987,  the  Belgian  franc  rose  by  2%  against 
the  ecu  and  registered  no  more  than  a  1%  fall  against  the  German 
mark. 
In  recent  years,  the  monetary  authorities  have  pursued  the  follo-
wing  objectives: 
maintenance  of  the Belgian franc's stabl I tty within  the  EMS; 120 
110 
90 
79 
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gradual  reconstitution of  exchange  reserves; 
exploitation of  the  fundamental  Improvement  In  the situation  In 
order  to  narrow  the  Interest-rate  differential  with  the 
strongest  European  currencies. 
GRAPH  3: THE  POSITION.OF  THE  BELGIAN  FRANC 
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These  targets  have  been  met  without  any  major  difficulties  being 
encountered.  The  Belgian  franc  has  remained  virtually  stable 
against  t"e  ecu.  Following  a  slight  decline  In  October/November 
1987,  It  remained  unchanged  against  the  German  mark  untl I  the 
beginning of  1990.  In  practice,  It  has  not  come  under  any  pressure, 
and  the  gap  between  the  regulated  and  the  unregulated  markets  has 
remained  very  small,  exceeding  1X  only  for  very  short  per lods, 
notably  when  major  financial  transactions  were  being  conducted(1) 
(see Graph  7). 
Exchange  reserves  have  risen  significantly  under  the  combined 
Impact  of  the  surplus  In  "autonomous"  balance-of-payment 
transactions and  continued  foreign-currency  borrowing  by  the publ lc 
authorities. 
The  decline  In  short-term  Interest  rates  (see  Graph  4)  from  7.75% 
at  the  beginning  of  1987  to  6.1%  In  mld-1988  was  more  pronounced 
than  In  other  European  countries because of  the  particularly marked 
fall  In  Inflation,  which  led  to  complete  el lmlnatlon  of  the 
Inflation differential  with  Germany.  The  Increase  up  to  1989  (from 
6.1X  to 9.6X  In  October  1989)  has  been  less steep,  with  the Belgian 
franc  benefItIng  from  the  per lods  of  reI at I  ve  weakness  of  the 
German  mark  agaInst  the  US  do II ar.  The  short-term  Interest-rate 
differential  relative  to  German  rates  thus  narrowed  almost 
continually untl I  mld-1989,  from  three percentage points  In  1987  to 
around  1.5 percentage points. 
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(1)  Transactions  In  securities  Issued  by  the  Societe  Generate  de 
Belgique. -37-
At  the  end  of  1989  and  during  the  first  few  months  of  1990,  the markets 
were  dominated  by  considerations  relating  to  the  possible  consequences 
of  the  events  In  Eastern  Europe  and  by  the  prospect  of  German  monetary 
unIfIcatIon.  The  genera I  upward  movement  In  rates  In  the  CommunIty 
produced  In  Belgium  rates  of  over  10%  at  both  the  short  end  and  long 
end.  The  relative weakening  of  the  German  mark  within  the  EMS  made  for 
a  narrowing of  the  Interest-rate differential. 
GRAPH  5  NOMINAL  LONG-TERM  INTEREST  RATES 
Source  Commission  departments. 
However,  any  assessment  of  the  role  of  monetary  policy  and  the 
headroom  It  affords should also take  account  of  the  following: 
the  dIfferent I  a I  between  Interest  rates  adjusted  for  current 
Inflation  In  Belgium  and  Germany  was  still  relatively  wide 
until  the  end  of  1989  (see  Graph  6).  This  can  be  ascribed  to 
various  factors  Including:  (I)  the  withholding  tax  on  Income 
from  savings  In  Belgium;  (I I)  the  smaller  size  and  lower 
effIcIency  of  f I  nanc I  a I  markets  In  Be I  g 1  um;  ( I I I )  the  hIgh 
level  of  publ lc  borrowing,  which  necessitates  a  sustained 
adjustment,  even  though  the  risk of  monetization  and  hence  the 
exchange  rIsk  are  I  ow,  gIven  the  sea I  e  of  domestIc  prIvate 
saving; 
the  need  to  take  account  of  the  domestic  objective of  monetary 
policy  has  traditionally  been  reflected  In  a  small  or  negative 
differential  between  long-term  and  short-term  rates.  Since  the 
State  Is  the  main  borrower,  long-term  Interest  rates  are 
heavl ly  Influenced  by  the  negotiations between  the Treasury  and 
a  consortium  of  financial  Intermediaries.  The  government's 
ability  to  force  down  long-term  Interest  rates  Is,  however, -38-
limited  by  the  fact  that  an  unduly  low  Interest  rate  relative 
to  rates  abroad  would  simply  speed  up  the  already  very  large 
volume  of  long-term  capital  outflows.  The  Treasury  tends, 
therefore,  to  Increase  Its short-term  financing  when  long-term 
rates  are  deemed  to  be  too  high.  As  a  result,  the  yield  curve 
Is  generally  flatter  or  more  Inverted  than  In  other  countries. 
While  such  a  sltuat lon  could  be  regarded  as  being  favourable 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  public-debt  burden  (60%  of  which 
Is  made  up  of  medium-term  and  long-term  securities)  and 
productIve  Investment  as  opposed  to  Investment  In  f I  nanc I  a I 
assets,  It  may  be  a  source of  lnstabl I lty  for  capital  movements 
wl th  other  countr les  by  favour lng  short-term  over  long-term 
Investments. 
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Source  Commission  departments. 
The  generally  positive  picture  as  far  as  the  exchange  rate, 
Interest  rates  and  the  Inflation-rate  differential  are  concerned 
has,  It  Is  true,  been  favourably  Influenced  by  the  relative 
stab II 1  ty  that  has  been  a  feature  of  the  EMS  for  more  than  two 
years.  Baslcal ly,  however,  It  stems  from  the  fact  that  the effects 
of  the  domestic  adlystment  col Icy.  engendered  by  Income  moderation. 
and  the  effects of  the  gradual  strengthening  of  the  exchange  rate 
In  the  EMS  haye  been  self-reinforcing.  The  strong  currency option, 
publicly  confirmed  In  June  1990,  wl  I I  further  enhance  credlbll tty 
and  contribute  to  the  virtuous circle. -39-
Following  a  period  In  which  the  exchange  rate  has  gradually 
strengthened within  the  EMS,  Belgium  seems  to be  comparatively wei I 
prepared  for  the  process  of  economIc  and  monetary  unIfIcatIon  In 
the  Community.  The  success  of  the  announced  policy  of  following 
the  strong  Community  currencies  depends  on  the  ability  to  Impose 
new  constraints on  the other  aspects of  economic  pol Icy,  notably  In 
order  to  Influence  the  following: 
the  trend  In  underlying  Inflation:  at  the moment,  Belgium  Is  In 
the  group  of  Community  countries  with  low  Inflation.  However, 
as  In  most  other  Member  States,  the  forecasts of wage  costs  for 
1990  point  to  an  appreciable  acceleration  In  Inflation. 
Admittedly,  the  exchange-rate  option  can,  In  a  very  open 
economy  I Ike  Belgium's,  contribute  to  a  healthy  Inflation 
performance  but  the  process  of  wage  formation  and  the  way  In 
which  rising costs are  passed  on  In  prices also  play  a  crucial 
role; 
the scope  for  running  a  continuing current-account  surplus:  the 
trend  In  the  factors  Influencing  real  competitiveness  will  be 
crucial  and  will  depend  among  other  things  on  the  effects  of 
the  current  wave  of  Investment  and  on  the  ab Ill ty  to  carry 
through  appropriate  sectoral  strategies  In  the  run-up  to 
establ lshment  of  the  Internal  market; 
pursuit  of  a  restrictive  budgetary  policy:  prompt  achievement 
of  the objective of  stabilizing and  then  reducing  the  debt/GOP 
ratio  Is  essential.  Moreover,  the  need  to  maintain  a 
current-account  surplus  while,  at  the  same  time,  fostering  a 
major  private-Investment  drive  calls  for  a  simultaneous 
contraction  In  public dlssavlng. 
4.3 Extending  the  panooly  of monetary  policy  Instruments 
For  fifteen  years  or  so,  the  central  bank  has ·exerted  Influence 
over  the  money  market  prlmarl ly  through  Its  manipulation  of 
Interest  rates.  The  quantitative  measures  for  control I lng  the 
supp I  y  of  credIt  dIrect I  y  or  IndIrect I  y  - redIscount  ce I I I  ngs, 
compulsory  monetary  reserves,  obligation  to  reinvest  In  government 
stock  and  securities- have  not  been  actively used  since 1975. -40-
Alongside  the  official  and  special  rediscount  rates  and  the  rates 
for  advances,  the  centra I  bank  I tse If  fIxes  the  rates  on  very 
short-term  Treasury  certificates  (one,  two  and  three  months).  The 
rate  on  three-month  certificates  has,  during  the  1980s,  gradually 
become  the  benchmark  rate  for  the  money  market  because  of  the 
amount  of  such  securities  held  In  financial  Intermediaries' 
portfolios  and  because  they  are  Issued  contlnuously(1).  Under  the 
circumstances,  the  action of  the central  bank  Is  both  efficient and 
flexible,  the  aim  being  to  Influence  the  entire  structure  of 
short-term  Interest  rates. 
Within  the  framework  of  a  monetary  policy  geared  primarily  to 
safeguarding  the  external  value  of  the  currency,  the  Interest-rate 
policy  pursued  alms  mainly  to  Influence  short-term  capital  flows. 
According  to  the  needs  of  reserve management,  the  central  bank  also 
Influences  the  way  In  which  any  market  Intervention  Is  financed:  by 
determining  the differential  between  the  discount  rate and  the  rate 
on  short-term  cer t If I  cates,  It  can  eIther  promote  Treasury 
financing  on  the  money  market  or,  on  the  contrary,  encourage  the 
Treasury  to  borrow  In  foreign  currencies.  In  May  1985,  the  method 
of  fIxIng  the  dIscount  rate  was  mod If led  In  order  to  a I low  more 
flexible  manipulation  of  this  rate  differential.  In  recent  years, 
the  discount  rate  has  nearly  always  been  held  at  a  level  higher 
than  the  rate on  Treasury certificates and  the  banks  have  virtually 
never  ava lied  themse I  ves  of  the  redIscount  fac I II tIes  or  centra I 
bank  advances  In  order  to boost  their  I lquldlty. 
The  effect lveness  of  the  policy  on  Interest  rates  Is,  therefore, 
entirely  dependent  on  the  predominant  role  played  by  Treasury 
certificates.  Now,  In  a  constantly  changing  financial  environment 
where,  among  other  things,  new  financial  Instruments  need  to  be 
deployed,  the  Influence  of  the  central  bank  on  the  money  market 
might  weaken.  Consequently,  the  authorities  have  taken  pre-emptive 
action,  equipping  the central  bank  with  new  Instruments: 
Since  very  I lttle use  Is  made  of  rediscounting,  a  new  system of 
fixed-term  advances  (14  days)  was  Introduced  In  March  1989  with 
a  view  to restoring a  more  direct  I Ink  between  the  central  bank 
and  f I  nanc I  a I  I  ntermed I  arIes.  It  I  nvo I  ves  week I  y  tenders  of 
advances  against  government  bl I Is,  and  sale  and  repurchase 
transactions  In  commercial  bills.  Such  operations  have  so  far 
been  carried out  on  a  relatively  limited  scale.  The  system  was 
devised  In  part lcular  to  allow  the  central  bank  to  Influence 
very  short-term  Interest  rates  and,  by  fixing  both  the  volume 
and  the  Interest  rate,  to  provide  the  market  with  pointers  as 
(1)  Taken  together,  Treasury certificates at  not  more  than one  year  and 
four-month  certificates  Issued  by  the  "Fonds  des  Rentes"  account 
for  over  85%  of  financial  Intermediaries'  liquidity. -41-
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to  the  direction  of  monetary  policy  without  necessarily 
adJusting  the  rate  on  Treasury  certificates.  In  practice, 
however,  the  maIn  functIon  unt II  now  of  th 1  s  new  form  of 
financing  has  been  to  allow  the  monetary  authorities  to  be 
better  Informed  of market  expectations; 
When  the  central  bank's  statute  was  revised  In  December  1988, 
the  I  ega I  provIsIons  governIng  the  reserve  reQuIrement  were 
amended<1>.  The  central  bank  may  now  Impose  a  permanent 
reserve  reQuirement  according  to  a  scale  that  ranges  from  8% 
(maximum)  for  sight  deposits  to  4.5%  for  deposits  at  not  more 
than  one  year  and  2%  for  II ab Ill t les  at  more  than  one  year. 
Although  the  authorities  have  no  Intention  at  the  moment  of 
applying  It,  this arrangement  Is  Intended  first  and  foremost  to 
contend  wIth  the  structura I  trend  of  the  demand  for  notes, 
associated  Inter  alIa  with  technological  Innovation,  which 
tends  to  reduce  the  central  bank's  Influence  over  the 
actlvltles of  financial  Institutions. 
In  May  1990  the  National  Bank  of  Belgium  announced  a 
reorganIsatIon  of  the  market  for  Treasury  certIfIcates,  Its 
maIn  veh I  c I  e  for  the  conduct  of  monetary  poI Icy.  The  present 
system of  Issuing Treasury certificates on  tap will  be  replaced 
on  1.1.1991  by  tenders  on  a  weekly  basis  for  3  month 
certificates  or  on  a  monthly  basis  for  12  month  certificates. 
Moreover,  the  certificates  will  be  dematerlal lzed  and  the 
market  which  was  until  now  restricted  to  domestic  (and 
Luxembourg)  f I  nanc I  a I  I  nst I tut Ions  will  be  en I  arged  to  a II 
Investors.  In  order  to  compete  effectively  with  foreign 
f I  nanc I  a I  markets  the  creatIon  of  an  actIve  secondary  market 
for  Treasury  certificates  will  be  stimulated  through  the 
setting  up  of  a  system  of  Primary  Dealers  and  an  efficient 
clearing system. 
In  addition  to  the  substantial  reform  of  the  Treasury 
certificates  market,  the  National  Bank  of  Belgium  announced 
that  It  Is  seeking  to  further  develop  the  new  techniQues  for 
Intervening  on  domestic  money  markets,  baslcal ly,  the 
periodical  tenders  for  advances  (Introduced  In  March  1989)  and 
In  between  the  tenders  to  make  use  of  repurchase  agreements, 
foreign exchange  swaps  and  open  market  operations. 
(1)  Law  of  23  December  1988.  Previously,  the  Law  of  1973  Imposed 
restrictions  on  the  compulsory  reserve  Instrument,  making  Its  use 
cond It lona I  on  the  presence  of  eye II ca I  lmperat I  ves  and  limItIng 
Its  ope rat I  on  to  a  per lod  of  sIx  months.  The  need  to  act  In 
accordance  with  cyclical  Imperatives  has  been  retained  In  the  new 
law  but  the six-month  time  I lmlt  has  been  dispensed with. -43-
This  extension  In  the  panoply  of  monetary  pol Icy  Instruments 
satisfies  the  new  requirements of  domestic  monetary  control  but  Is 
also consistent  with  the  moves  towards  economic  and  monetary  union 
In  the Community  In  so far  as: 
the  monetary  authorities  wished  to  have  at  their  disposal  the 
same  Instruments  as were  aval lable  In  most  other  Member  States: 
Harmonizing  the  means  of  action  available  to  central  banks 
within an  Integrated financial  area  Is  a  necessary  prerequisite 
for  closer monetary  cooperation; 
one  main  aspect  of  Belgium's  strategy  of  preparing  for  the 
I  arge  I  nterna I  market  Is  to  develop,  modernIze  and  open-up 
capital  and  money  markets. 
4.4 pegree of  central  bank  autonomy 
Lega II y  speakIng,  the  degree  of  autonomy  enjoyed  by  the  Nat lona I 
Bank  Is  relatively  I lmlted: 
at  lnst ltut lonal  level,  the  central  government  holds  by  law 
half  of  the  Bank's  capital.  The  government  appoints  the 
d 1  rectors  on  a  proposa 1  from  the 
11Conse II  de  Regence..  and 
designates  a  government  commissioner  who  Is  responsible  for 
supervising  the Bank's operations and  has  a  right of suspensory 
veto  over  any  measures  deemed  by  h  lm  to  be  contrary  to  the 
.. Interests of  the State  .. ; 
joint consultations are  held on  Interest-rate pol Icy:  the  rates 
on  very  short-term certificates Cone,  two  and  three months)  are 
set  by  the  Bank  Itself  while  the  rates  on  short-term 
cert 1  f I  cates  (sIx,  nIne  and  twe 1  ve  months)  and  certIfIcates 
Issued  by  the 
11Fonds  des  Rentes  ..  are  fixed  after  consultations 
with  the Treasury  and  the  ..  Fonds  des  Rentes  ..  respectively; 
following  the  recent  revision of  Its statute,  and  In  particular 
the  rules governing  the  Imposition of  reserve  requirements,  the 
National  Bank  Is  empowered  to  Issue  duly  reasoned  regulations 
Imposing  such  requirements  after  consulting  the  Banking 
Commission  and  after  receiving ministerial  approval. 
In  practIce,  however,  the  government  does  not  Intervene  In  the 
day-to-day  conduct  of  monetary  poI Icy  and  Its  rIght  of  veto  has 
never  been  used. -44-
Monetary  aspects of  public-deficit  financing 
1.  Financing  channels  for  the Treasury 
The  Treasury  has  recourse  to  three  types  of  financing:  the  Issuing 
of  bonds  on  the  domestic  capital  market  (see  point  5.2), 
money-market  borrowing  In  Belgian  francs,  and  borrowing  In  forelgr, 
currencies. 
1.1  The  Treasury  has  two  credit  lines  with  the  central  bank  that 
are subject  to flat-rate ceilings: 
-since  1977,  the  direct  credit  I lne  has  been  I lmlted  to 
BFR  37  bn  and  has  been  fully used  at  all  times; 
- In  order  to  cover  .. seasona I  and  unforeseen  defIcIts  .. ,  the 
Treasury  has  access  to  Indirect  financing  from  the  central 
bank  In  the  form  of  special  advances  granted  to  the  "Fonds 
des  Rentes  ..  for  the  purpose  of  subscribing  for  Treasur' 
certificates.  The  ceiling  on  this  Indirect  credit  line  is 
I  aId  down  by  agreement  between  the  centra I  bank  and  the 
"Fonds  des  Rentes  ..  In  the  light  of  Treasury  requirements  and 
the  money-market  situation.  This  eel ling,  which  was  at 
BFR  30  billion  In  1978,  was  quickly  raised  In  line  with  the 
deterioration  In  public  finances  to  stand  at  BFR  210  bll I lon 
In  1983,  where  It  remained  until  September  1987.  Since  then, 
with  the  substantial  reduction  In  the  Treasury  borrowing 
requirement  and  with  the  Increase  In  money-market  liQuidity 
notably as a  result of  the  Improvement  In  the current-account 
balance,  the  ceiling  for  special  advances  was  progressively 
lowered  to  BFR  130  billion  by  mld-1989.  Actual  recourse  to 
this type of  financing  has  declined steadily  In  the meantime. 
1.2  The  opening  of  a  .. third window ..  for  Treasury  financing  depends 
on  the central  bank's  Interest-rate policy.  This  Is because  the 
gap  between  the  discount  rate  and  the  yield  on  Treasury 
certificates,  both  fixed  by  the  central  bank,  determines 
whether  or  not  financial  Intermediaries  have  recourse  to  the 
refinancing  facilities  available  to  them  at  the  central  bank, 
subject  to  the  authorized  eel lings  set,  and  whether  they 
decide,  therefore,  to hold  fewer  or  more  government  bills.  This 
"thIrd  wIndow ..  can  be  a  very  effectIve  way  of  boostIng  money 
creation.  However,  If  the  rate  of  money  creation  needs  to  be 
curbed,  this window  will  necessarily  have  to be  shut,  as  It  has 
been  In  recent  years. 
1.3  Central  aovernment  borrowing  In  forelan  currencies,  the 
proceeds  of  which  are  transferred  direct  to  the  central  bank, 
Is  the  fourth  way  In  which  Treasury  financing  can  result  In 
I lquldlty  creation.  The  external  borrowing  policy  of  the 
Belgian  authorities  depends  on  the  current-account  situation, 
private capital  movements  and  the  targets set  for  management  of 
the  exchange  reserves.  A further  benefit  of  external  borrowing 
Is  that  It  reduces  the  pressure on  domestic  Interest  rates but, 
In  return,  ental Is  a  future  burden  on  the  current-account 
balance and  a  possible exchange  risk. 1978 
1983 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
-45-
Direct  and  indirect  Treasury  borrowing 
in  Belgian  francs  from  the  National  Bank 
of  Belgium 
(amount  outstanding at  end  of  period) 
Total  of  which:  Maximum 
lending  direct  indirect  amount  of 
indirect 
lendlng 
authorized 
i 
53  37  16  30  I  225  37  188  210 
246  37  209  210  ! 
165  37  128  l  180 
144  37  1.07 
I 
160 
103  37  66  110 
(4  m)  59  37  22  110 
Source:  Banque  Natlona!e  de  Belgique. 
jn  BFR  bn 
Net 
Treasury 
balance 
to  be 
financed 
183 
524 
555 
431 
434 
397 
254 
2.  Reform  of  the State and  financing  of  other  public sector entitles 
Among  the  provisions of  the  reform  of  the  State  aimed  at  preserving 
economic  union  and  safeguarding  the  currency  Is  a  measure  requiring 
approval  from  the  Minister  of  Finance  for  borrowing  operations 
undertaken  by  the  Communities  and  the  regions  the  terms  of  which  may 
affect  monetary  and  exchange-rate  pol icy,  I.e.  foreign  borrowing  In 
Belgian  francs  and  foreign-currency  borrowing.  The  floating  of 
public  loans  on  the  Belgian  capital  markets  wl  I I  have  to  be 
compatible  with  the  calendar  set  by  the  Ministerial  Councl I,  after 
consu 1 t i ng  the  executive  bodIes  concerned.  On I  y  prIvate  loans  In 
Belgian  francs  wi  I I  be  completely  free  from  restrictions.  Safeguard 
c I auses  have,  however,  been  Inc I  uded  In  the  I  egIs I at I  on,  enab II ng 
the  national  government  to  limit  the  borrowing  capacity  of  one  or 
more  entities for  a  maximum  of  two  years,  with  a  view  to: 
-ensuring that  divergent  movements  in  financing  requirements  do  not 
endanger  economic  union  and  the  currency; 
-safeguarding  domestic  price  stabi I ity  and  the  balance-of-payments 
equilibrium; 
-preventing a  structural  deterioration  in  public  finances. 
The  government  would  act  on  the  advice  c1  a  consultative  body  set  up 
within  the  .. Conseil  superieur  des  Finance:s:'', -46-
5.  ADAPTATION  OF  FINANCIAL  MARKETS  WITH  A YIEW  TO  1992 
In  a  fast-changing  economic  and  financial  environment,  and  In 
particular  with  a  view  to  European  financial  Integration  and 
completion of  the single market,  the Belgian  financial  market  seems 
Insufficiently  developed.  This  situation  has  led  the  Government  to 
devise,  In  collaboration  with  those  concerned,  and  to  begin 
Implementing  a  major  programme  of  reform.  Various  aspects  of  the 
operatIon  of  f I  nanc I  a I  markets  and  the  condItIons  of  competItIon 
among  f I  nanc I  a I  I  ntermed I  arIes  have  been  addressed.  The  measures 
already adopted  or  being  considered can  be  divided  Into  :  abol ltlon 
of  the  two-tier  exchange  market;  reform  of  public  debt  management; 
reform  of  the  Brussels  stock  exchange;  plans  to  restructure  public 
credit  Institutions;  deregulation of  Interest  rates;  and  reduction 
of withholding  tax. 
5.1  Abolition of  the  twp-tler  exchange  rate 
A two-tier  exchange  market  was  Introduced  In  Belgium  and  Luxembourg 
on  18  July  1955  within  the  framework  of  BLEU  {Belgo-Luxembourg 
Economic  Union).  On  the  regulated  market,  where  the  bulk  of 
commercial  transactions  were  carried out,  the  monetary  authorities 
Intervened  In  order  to  stab I I I  ze  the  exchange  rate  In  I I  ne  wIth 
International  agreements  {Bretton  Woods,  the  .. snake  .. ,  the  EMS).  As 
a  general  rule,  the  unregulated  market,  on  which  the  monetary 
authorItIes  dId  not  Intervene,  provIded  the  channe I  for  capIta I 
movements.  This  arrangement  was  designed,  on  the one  hand,  to  I lmlt 
the  amount  of  Intervention and,  on  the other,  to discourage capital 
outflows  by  raising  the  premium  payable  on  purchases  of  foreign 
exchange  In  the event  of  speculation against  the Belgian  franc. 
In  order  to  determine  which  transactions would  take  place  on  which 
market,  a  system  of  cont ro Is  was  1  nt roduced  whIch  hIndered  the 
settlement  of  both  financial  and  commercial  International 
transactions.  What  Is  more,  the  dividing  line  between  the  two 
markets  was  not  clear-cut.  For  Instance,  certain  current 
transactions  could  be  carried  out  on  the  unregulated  market 
<conversion  of  Income  received  from  portfolio  Investments  abroad, 
tourist  expenditure,  transactions  In  gold  and  diamonds)  whl  le 
certain  capital  movements  {transactions  Involving  deposits  In 
convertible  Belgian  francs  or  Involving  deposits  In  regulated 
currencies,  direct  Investment)  were  carried  out  on  the  regulated 
market. -47-
The  drawbacks  of  the  two-tier  exchange  market  as  regards 
transparancy  and  cumbersome  control  procedures,  Its  loss  of 
effectiveness  (see  Graph  7)  and  especially  Its  lack  of  usefulness 
as  the Belgian  franc  has  gradually strengthened within  the  EMS  over 
the  last  two  years  - these  factors  to  be  viewed  against  the 
background  of  the Community  Directive scrapping alI  restrictions on 
capital  movements  In  most  Member  States  on  1  July  1990  (1)  -
prompted  the  Belgian and  Luxembourg  authorities to abolIsh  the  two-
t ler  market  on  5  March  1990.  However,  the  necessary  arrangements 
for  compl I lng  statistics remain  In  place. 
GRAPH  7  :  TWO  TIER  EXCHANGE  MARKET, 
CAPITAL  OUTFLOWS  AND  LONG-TERM  INTEREST-RATE  DIFFERENTIAL 
: ··.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  :  .  I  Premium  on  dual  exchange  market I 
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Soyrce  National  Bank  of  Belgium; 
Commission  departments. 
(1)  Under  this  Directive  (88/361/EEC,  of  24  June  1988,  OJ  n·  L 178  of 
8  July  1988),  Belgium  and  Luxembourg  were  though  authorized  to keep 
the  two-tier  exchange  market  In  place until  31  December  1992. -48-
The  economic  context  was  favourable.  The  current  account  had  been 
In  surplus since  1985  (1%  of  GOP  In  1989)  and  the Belgian  franc  was 
performing  soundly  In  the  European  monetary  system,  with  an  average 
discount  against  the  German  mark  In  1989  of  1.60%  and  a  divergence 
Indicator  of  +50.  Under  the  circumstances,  abolition  of  the  two-
tier exchange  market  passed without  any  problems,  as  I I lustrated by 
the  stable  Interest-rate  differential  In  Belgium  and  Germany  (see 
Graph  7),and  has  not  prevented a  strengthening of  the Belgian  franc 
within  the  European  monetary  system  (see graph  3). 
5.2 Management  of  the  pub I lc  debt 
With  the main  purpose of  reducing  the  burden  of  publ lc  debt  as much 
as  possible,  the  Treasury  has  been  striving  for  several  years  to 
Improve  the  way  It  Is  managed,  not  only  through  specific  debt-
conversion  operations  but  also  through  Initiatives  I lkely  to 
encourage  the  development  and  modernization  of  the  Belgian 
financial  market. 
The  determlnat ion  to  pursue  a  more  act lve  public  debt  policy  was 
first  given  practical  shape  as  of  1984,  when  steps  were  taken  to 
restructure  the  foreign-currency  debt.  The  aim  was  to  reduce  the 
burden of  Interest  payments,  In  particular  through early  redemption 
with  refinancing  on  more  favourable  terms,  currency  swaps  and  the 
Introduction  of  the  Euro-commerclal  paper  programme<1>.  The 
proportion of  the  foreign-currency  debt  accounted  for  by  the  strong 
EMS  currencies  (the  German  mark  and  the  guilder)  rose  from  37%  In 
1984  to 47%  In  1989. 
Since  1986  the Treasury  has  also made  changes  In  the management  of 
the  Belgian  franc  debt,  Introducing  new  borrowing  techniques,  the 
maIn  effects  of  whIch  shou I  d  be  to  en I  arge  access  to  markets  In 
government  secur It los  and  to  extend  the  average  maturIty  of  the 
~- Besides  specific measures  such  as  regularization of  part  of 
the  debt  towards  banks<2>  or  the  use  of  the  gold  stock  of  the 
(1)  Placing  of  short-term  foreign-currency  loans  with  foreign 
commercial  groups,  thereby  enabling  the  Issue  proceeds  to  be 
swapped. 
(2)  On  three  occasions  (1986,  1988  and  1989),  debt-rescheduling 
agreements  were  reached  between  the  Ministry  of  Finance  and  the 
financial  Institutions,  with  part  of  the  Interest  due  on  earlier 
loans  being  converted  Into  "Treasury  bonds"  with  a  maturity of  six 
or eight  years  and  carrying rates  I Inked  to market  Interest  rates. -49-
central  bank,C1)  the  authorities  have  embarked  on  a  more  thorough 
reform of  central  government  financing  techniQues: 
a longs I  de  the  trad It lona I  system  of  underwrItIng  by  a 
consortium  of  financial  Institutions,  the  government  has 
started  Issuing  ''linear  bonds"<2>.  Within  a  credit  line,  the 
loans  are  Issued  In  successive  Instalments  and  placed  as  a 
function  of  the  amounts  and  prices  offered.  These  new 
borrowing  arrangements  should  not  only  make  It  possible  to 
enlarge  the  primary  market  In  long-term  government  securities 
but  also  make  the  secondary  market  more  active  and  more 
attractive  to  foreign  Investors.  First,  each  new  Instalment 
should  Increase  market  liQUidity,  the  secondary  market  having 
been  fairly  Ill IQuld  and  Inactive  to date,  with  over  50X  of  the 
debt  held  In  the  portfolios  of  domestic  banks.  Second, 
Interest  will  be  paid  In  full,  and  not,  as  with  traditional 
forms  of  borrowing,  net  of  withholding  tax  with  subseQuent 
refunding of  tax  to foreign  Investors; 
the  secondary  market  In  short-term  Treasury  certIfIcates  has 
been  open  to  I  nsur a  nee  compan I  es  and  pens I  on  funds  s I  nee  the 
middle  of  1987.  The  government  Is  considering  taking  other 
measures  of  this  kind  as  wei  1  as  admitting  non-financial 
enterprises  and  foreign  banks  to  the  primary  or  secondary 
market; 
the  structure  of  Quotas  and  commissions  for  the  underwr It lng 
consortium  was  recently  changed.  In  particular,  the  share 
earmarked  for  foreign  banks  was  raised from  5.51 to 9.61. 
(1)  Gold  Is  sold  In  two  separate  ways:  (I)  the  sale  of  commemorative 
coins,  with  the  volume  of  gold  used  for  minting  such  coins  being 
specified  by  law  and  with  profits going  to  the  Treasury.  In  1987, 
the central  bank  sold gold with  a  market  value of  BFR  10  bl II lon  to 
the  Treasury  for  the  Issue  of  ecu  coins;  (II)  sales of  gold on  the 
market,  notably  at  the  beginning  of  1989  the  profits of  which  are 
placed  In  a  reserve  fund  that  cannot  be  touched,  while  the  Income 
from  the  Investment  of  the  foreign  currency acquired  Is  paid  to the 
Treasury. 
(2)  A  system  similar  to  the  French  "obligations  ass1m1lables  du 
T.resar".  The  first  I lnear  Issue was  floated  In  May  1989. -50-
5.3 Reform  of  the stock exchange 
Compared  with  the  other  exchanges  In  Europe,  the  Brussels  stock 
exchange  Is  of  minor  Importance.  The  capitalization  of  domestic 
shares  I lsted  In  1988  accounted  for  only  3.7X  of  the  total 
capitalization of  the  twelve  exchanges  In  the  Community  (dominated 
by  London  with  42.2X),  with  bond  capitalization  scarcely  any 
higher. 
TABLE  10  STRUCTURAL  DATA  FOR  THE  STOCK  EXCHANGE  IN  1989 
Shares  Bgnga 
Securities QUOted  478  147(a) 
domestic  304  138 
foreign  174 
CapIta II zat I  on  of  domestic 
securities  BFB  b I Ilion  2678  3641(a) 
X domestic  GDP  44  60 
X capital lzatlon  3.7  4.7 
EUB  12  (b) 
Volume  of  transactions 
BFB  b I Ilion  304  201(a) 
X capital lzatlon  11  0 4  5.5 
Volume  of  Issues  (BFB  billion) 
Private sector  103.3  7.8 
Pub I I  c  sector  545.4 
International  I  nst I tut Ions  6.0 
(a)  Including  bonds  Issued  by  International  Institutions 
(b)  1988 
Source  :  Brussels stock exchange; 
Committee  of  Stock  Exchanges  In  the  EEC. 
9 
Unt II  recent I  y,  the  bond  market  was  confIned  to  the  pI acIng  of 
medium-term  government  securities  (In  1987,  only  3X  of  the  public 
debt  was  In  the  form  of securities with  a  maturity of more  than  ten 
years)  through  an  underwrlttlng  consortium  of  financial 
Institutions.  It  Is  dominated  by  banks  and  credit  lnstltutlons<1> 
wh lch  hoI d  45X  of  pub lie  BelgIan-franc  bonds  access lb le  to  a II 
(1)  Primarily  monetary  Institutions,  savings  banks  and  public  credit 
Institutions. -51-
Investors.  The  volume  of  off-exchange  dealing  Is  very  large,  and 
this does  not  enhance  transparency.  It  Is  thought  to  be  five  times 
that  of  dealings  transacted  on  the  exchange,  I.e.  less  than  In 
Luxembourg  but  more  than elsewhere. 
The  stock  exchange  Plays.  If  anything.  a  modest  role  In  the 
financing  of  the  Prlyate  sector,  although  Its  role  has  expanded 
since  the  1970s.  In  1989,  the  provision of  new  capital  In  the  form 
of  share  Issues  doubled  compared  with  the  previous  year,  to 
BFR  103,3 billion  (161  of  total  new  liabilities  of  non-financial 
enterprises).  The  bond  market,  however,  does  not  represent  a  net 
source  of  capital  for  firms  as  redemptions  exceed  new  Issues.  This 
minor  role  contrasts  with  the  stock  exchange's  key  role  In  the 
financing  of  the  State,  which  Issued  publ lc  bonds  total ling 
BFR  545.4 bl I I lon  In  1989. 
Deye I  oPment  of  the  stock  exchange  Is  beIng  hamPered  by  var I  ous 
regulations,  a  lack  of  transparency  and  transactions  cost  that  Is 
generally  higher  than  elsewhere.The  steps  taken  a  few  years  ago  to 
boost  trading  on  the  stock  exchange- establishment  of  an  options 
market  (for  call  options  only)  and  a  Junior  market  In  1985- had 
only  I lmlted  success,  partly  because  of  the  very  restrictive 
guarantee  and  adm Iss !on  condItIons.  The  Brusse Is  stock  exchange 
remaIned  a  I  oca I  market  where  scant  progress  had  been  made  wIth 
computerization  and  to  which  only  approved  brokers  were  admitted. 
Radical  reform  was  required  If  Brussels was  to achieve  Its ambition 
of  becoming  a  European  financial  centre;  this  led  to  the setting-up 
In  1988  of  specialized  committees  to  study  and  propose  to  the 
government  measures  aimed  In  particular  at  modernizing  the 
operation  of  stock  markets,  reviewing  the  role  of  brokers  and 
extending  the  range of  financial  Instruments on  offer<1>. 
Some  of  the  proposals  made  by  these  committees  have  already  been 
adopted.  For  example,  It  has  been  decided  to  Introduce  a 
continuous  market  with  longer  trading  sessions  and,  since  January 
1989,  deals  have  been  recorded  using  a  computer-assisted  trading 
system  (CATs<2>),  which  makes  for  greater  transparency  (and  hence 
smaller  price discrepancies)  and  reduces  the  volume  of off-exchange 
dealing. 
(1)  The  committees were  the  "Comd.ssions Maystadt  I  and II  .. ,  made  up  of 
experts and  chaired  by  the Minister of  Finance. 
(2)  This  system  has  been  In  use  In  Toronto  since  1979  and  was 
Introduced  In  Paris  In  1986  and  Madrid  In  Apr! I  1989. -52-
Other  changes  are  expected  during  the  transition  period  (1989-
92)(1).  They  Include: 
ending  of  the  monopoly  enjoyed  by  brokers.  Financial 
lnst I tut Ions  will  have  access  to  stock  exchange  operatIons 
through  stock-market  fIrms.  1  n  the  In 1  t 1  a I  stages,  the 
holdings  of  financial  Institutions  In  the  capital  of  these 
f lrms  will  be  limited  to  25X;  the  limit  will  be  phased  out 
gradually  and  removed  entirely  by  1992.  Moreover,  the  minimum 
percentage  of  orders  that  must  be  transmitted  via  brokers  will 
be  gradually  reduced,  from  SOX  In  1989  to  20X  In  1992,  and  as 
of  1993  all  orders may  be  transmitted via stock-market  firms; 
Increase  In  the  ceilings  on  off-exchange  dealing,  from 
BFR  1  o m  I Ilion  to  BFR  20  m  I Ilion  for  cash  transact Ions  and  to 
BFR  30  ml I I lon  for  forward  transactions; 
reduction  In  commissions,  the  actual  reduction  becoming  larger 
as  the  volume  of  transact Ions  Increases.  New  apport lonment 
formulae  as  between  banks  and  brokers  are  also  to  be 
Introduced; 
development  of  new  products  and  markets,  such  as  Instruments 
In  ecus  and  forward  contracts  In  government  securities; 
adoption  of  the  regulations  on  col lectlve  Investment 
undertakings;  this  wl  I I  permit  the  establ lshment  of  SICAVs 
(open-ended  Investment  companies)  In  Belgium;  since 
1 October  1989,  the  marketing  of  units  of  foreign  collective 
lnvesmtent  undertakings  meeting  the  requirements  of  the 
EEC  Dlrectlve<2>  has  been  possible  In  Belgium,  whereas  the 
marketing  of  units  of  Belgian  undertakings  has  not  been 
possible abroad; 
I  nt roduct I  on  of  a  new  supervIsory  structure,  Inc I  ud I  ng 
t r ansforma t I  on  of  the  BankIng  CommIssIon  Into  a  BankIng  and 
Financial  Commission  responsible  for  market  supervision  and 
coordination; 
Alongside  these  basic  reforms,  which  should  ensure  that  the 
structure of  the  Brussels  stock  exchange  Is  similar  to  that  of  the 
(1)  The  draft  law  on  financial  operations  and  financial  markets  Is  at 
present  under  discussion. 
(2)  Directive of  20  December  1985  (OJ  n·  L 375  of  31  December  1985). -53-
major  European  financial  centres,  there  have  also  been  changes  In 
the stock-exchange  rules: 
certain  rules  have 
concerning 
covered<1>; 
Insider 
been  In 
dealing, 
force  since  September  1989 
which  was  not  previously 
new  ru I  es  have  been  Introduced  for  takeover  bIds:  s I  nee  May 
1989,  shareholders  with  more  than  5%  of  a  company's  capital 
must  dIsc loseC2)  theIr  IdentIty;  the  procedures  to  be 
followed  for  a  takeover  bld(3)  were  clarified  In  November 
1989. 
5.4 Bestryctyrlng of  pybllc credit  lnstltytlons 
Adjusting  to  the  8%  solvency  ratio  Imposed  by  a 
dlrectlve<4>  will  require  an  effort  on  the  part 
Institutions,  especially  those  In  the  publ lc  sector. 
Community 
of  credit 
TABLE  11  PROFITABILITY  AND  SOLVENCY  OF  CREDIT  INSTITUTIONS 
Profltabll lty  (a) 
(average  1986-87) 
Solvency  (b) 
(end  1987) 
Banks 
0,33 
6,7  (C) 
6  PCis  Savings  banks 
0,12  0,63 
7,7  14,9  (d) 
(a)  Net  profits as  a  proportion of  own  and  borrowed  funds. 
(b)  Weighted  value  of  risks  on  and  off  the  balance  sheet  as  a 
proportion of  own  funds. 
(c)  Only  the  four  largest  banks. 
(d)  Only  the  four  largest  savings  banks. 
~e  :  I  nst I tut Ions  pub II ques  de  credIt  1992,  Comrn Iss I  on 
d'experts  (Rapport  Verplaetse),  Bulletin  de  pocymenta-
tlon Mlnlstere  des  Finances,  mars-avrl I  1989. 
(1)  Royal  Decree  of  4  September  1989  (Monlteur  Beige  of  16  September 
1989.  Subsequent  to  the  .. Insider  dealing  ..  Directive of  13  November 
1989  (OJ  n·  L334  of  18  November  1989),  the  draft  law  on  financial 
operations  and  financial  markets  provides  for  a  number  of 
amendments. 
(2)  Royal  Decree of  10  May  1989  (Monlteur  Beige of  24  May  1989)  adopted 
pursuant  to  the  DIrectIve  of  12  December  1988  concernIng  major 
holdings  (OJ  n·  L 348  of  17  December  1988). 
(3)  Boya I  Decree  of  8  November  1989  (Mon I teur  Be lge  of  11  November 
1989)  adopted  In  anticipation  of  the  Directive  on  takeover  bids 
being  prepared  by  the Commission  (OJ  n·  C 64  of  14  March  1989). 
(4)  Directive  of  18  December  1989  (OJ  n·  L  386  of  30  November  1989) 
appl !cable with effect  from  1  January  1993. -54-
For,  although  publ lc  credit  Institutions  (PCis)  have  a  higher 
solvency  ratio  than  banks,  their  position  Is  not  altogether 
comfortable.  Their  market  share  has  been  declining  for  a  number  of 
years<1>  and  their  poor  profltabl llty  (see  Table  11)  makes  It 
difficult  to generate equity capital  by  setting aside profits.  What 
Is  more,  the  size  of  the  public  debt  of  the  State,  which  Is  the 
I  argest  shareho I  der,  does  not  permIt  any  strengthenIng  of  equIty 
capital  by  way  of  capital  Increases. 
In  order  to  boost  prof I tab I I I ty  and  to  prepare  PC Is  for  a  more 
competitive  environment  by  1992,  the  Government,  on 
29  September  1989,  tabled  a  draft  law  that  Is  based  on  the  work  of 
a  committee  of  experts<2>  and  proposes  a  restructuring  of  the  six 
PCls  Into  two  groups  :  one  centred on  the Caisse Generale  d'Epargne 
et  de  Retralte  (CGER),  and  the  other  on  the  Credit  Communal.  The 
State  will  remain  the  main  shareholder,  with  the  result  that  the 
public  nature  of  these  Institutions  will  be  preserved.  The  draft 
law  also  provides  for  measures  to  bring  the  conditions  of 
compet It lon  Into  line  with  those  facing  banks(3).  And  so,  the 
PCis  wl  I I  be  subject  to  control  by  the  Banking  Commission  and  the 
State guarantee  for  I lab! I ltles wl  I I  be  abol !shed. 
5.5 peregylatlon of  Interest  rates 
The  rules  governing  Interest  rates,  notably  on  savings  accounts, 
Imposes  a  burden  on  financial  Intermediation  In  Belgium.  They  were 
desIgned  to  preserve  .. hea I  thy..  competItIon  on  the  savIngs  market 
and  to  be  of  assistance  In  the  conduct  of  monetary  policy.  What  Is 
more,  the  regulation of  Interest  rates on  financial  assets that  are 
substItutes  for  State  bonds  created  condItIons  favourable  to  the 
fInancIng  of  the  budget  defIcIt.  Such  regu I  at I  on  a I  so  made  It 
possible  for  financial  Intermediaries  to  attract  relatively  low-
cost  funds.  However,  savers  are  now  Increasingly  shunning  national 
credit  Institutions.  In  1989,  only  around  4ox<4>  of  new  financial 
assets  owned  by  Individuals  and  firms  were  held  with  Belgium 
lntermedlar les.  Against  this,  70X  of  their  new  llablllt les  are 
loans  contracted with  Belgian  lntermedlalres. 
(1)  In  1970,  the  PCis  accounted  for  46.3X  of  all  the  financial  assets 
held  by  firms  and  Individuals  with  national  financial 
Intermediaries.  This  figure  fel I  to 36.9X  In  October  1989. 
(2)  Institutions  publlques  de  credit,  Commission  d'experts  (rapport 
Verplaetse),  Bulletin  de  pocymentatlon.  MlnlstOre  des  Finances. 
March-Apr! I  1989. 
( 3)  Fo 1 I  owIng  the  report  by  a  commIt tee  chaIred  by  Mr  Van  de  Voorde 
(harmonisation des  conditions de  fonctlonnement  des  Institutions de 
credit,  Byl let In  de  pocymentatlon.  Mln!stOre  des  Finances,  May 
1988). 
(4)  National  Bank  of  Belgium,  Annual  Report  1989. -55-
Since  they  were  aware  that  such  an  Imbalance  added  to  the  costs of 
Intermediation,  and  under  pressure  from  the  smal I  banks,  which  were 
pursuing  a  more  aggressive  commercial  pol Icy,  the  authorities 
relaxed  the  rules(1)  by  Royal  Decree  of  1  June  1989  with  a  view  to 
allowing  greater  competltlon<2>.  This  partial  deregulation  does 
not,  however,  appear  to  have  been  sufficient  and  a  new  draft  law  Is 
being  prepared. 
The  regulation of  mortgage  Interest  rates  Is  also a  handicap.  Apart 
from  Greece  and  Denmark,  Belgium  Is  the  only  country  In  the 
Community  that  does  not  authorize  variable  mortgage  Interest 
rates<3>.  The  draft  law  currently  under  preparation  proposes 
greater  flexibility  while  retaining  the  possibility  of  applying 
fixed  Interest  rates.  These  new  rules  should  make  It  possible  to 
compete  more  effectively with  mortgage  products offered  by  foreign 
companies  once  the  relevant  Community  directives  have  entered  Into 
force<4>. 
5.6 Reduction of  withholding  tax 
Together  with  the  rigidity  of  certain  deposit  rates,  the  25% 
withholding  tax  on  Investment  Income  can  be  regarded  as  one  of  the 
main  reasons  why  savings  denominated  In  Belgian  francs  are  now  a 
less  attractive  proposition  for  residents.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
1980s,  73%  of  savings  formed  during  the  year  were  held  In  belgian 
francs.  In  1989,  this  figure  had  fallen  to  42%  (see  Table  12).  In 
addition  to  the  shortfall  In  financial  resources  for  the  national 
economy,  the  heavy  burden  of  taxation  on  savings  Is  hampering  the 
development  of  new  financial  activities  In  Belgium.  For  example, 
the  bulk  of  funds  Invested  In  collective  Investment  undertakings 
are  raised  by  Luxembourg  Institutions  (set  up  In  many  cases  by  the 
Luxembourg-based  subsidiaries of  Belgian  banks). 
(1)  The  rules,  which  had  been  Introduced  by  Royal  Decree  of 
13  March  1986,  had  the  effect  of  reducing  competition,  which  was 
deemed  to  be  excessive  and  was,  therefore,  holding  back  any 
downward  movement  In  Interest  rates  (see  also  L.  Buffel,  De 
Belglsche  Kredletlnstel llngen  op  weg  naar  1992,  Bullet In  de 
Documentation.  Mlnlstere des  Finances,  March-Apr I I  1990. 
(2)  Without  ental I lng  any  loss of  entitlement  to  the  tax  exemption,  the 
ceiling on  loyallty  and  growth  premiums  was  raised  from  35%  to  50% 
of  the  base  Interest  rate,  which  Is stl I I  fixed  by  Royal  Decree. 
(3)  At  most,  Interest  rates  may  be  adjusted  every  five  years  In  line 
with  market  developments. 
(4)  The  second  Banking  Directive  (OJ  n·  L386  of  30  December  1986) 
enters  Into  force  on  1  January  1993  and  a  DIrectIve  on  mortgage 
credit  Is  being  prepared  (OJ  n·  C 161  of  19  June  1987). -56-
TABLE  12  COMPOSITION  OF  CORPORATE  AND  PERSONAL  SAVINGS 
as X 
1981-85  1989(a) 
In  Belgian  francs of  which  73  42 
bonds  and  notes at  more 
than one  year  38  11 
shares  3  5 
In  foreign  currency of  which  15  33 
bonds  12  19 
shares  - 5 
other  12  25 
financial  gold  1  -
undefined  (b)  11  25 
Total  100  100 
for  Information  : 
coli.  Investment  undertak I  ng1  2  12 
of which 
Luxembourg  Institutions  - 12(c) 
(In  BFR  bn)  (647)  (1244) 
(as X of  GOP)  ( 15)  (20) 
(a)  Extrapolation on  the basis of  10  months'  figures. 
(b)  Errors  and  ommlsslons  In  balance  of  payments  and  claims  on 
banks  (abroad). 
(c)  Extrapolation on  the  basis of  9  months'  figures. 
Source  National  Bank  of  Belgium,  Annual  Report  1989,  own 
calculations. 
The  growing  share of  Investment  In  other  countries  and  In  SICAVs  could 
represent  a  problem  In  reducing  the  revenue  raised  by  the  withholding 
tax.  However,  until  now,  this  problem  has  not  really  arisen,  because 
withholding  tax  as  a  proportion  of  total  tax  revenue  has  been 
Increasing  steadlly(1)  notwithstanding  the  Investment  of  savings 
abroad  and  In  Luxembourg  SICAVs.  This  favourable  evolution  of  the 
revenue  raised  by  the  withholding  tax  could,  however,  be  reversed  In 
the  future,  as  Indicated  by  figures  for  1989  :  only  the  revenue  raised 
by  the  withholding  tax  on  dividends  Is  Increasing  whl le  that  on 
Interest  Is decreasing. 
(1)  In  1974,  the  withholding  tax  accounted  for  4.9X  of  total  tax 
revenue  whereas,  In  1989,  Its share was  9.6X. -57-
Under  the  circumstances,  the  Belgian  authorities  on  1  March  1990-
lowered  from  25X  to  10X  the  withholding  tax<1>  on  lnterest<2>  charged 
on  new  Issues  of  financial  assets.  As  a  result,  financial  markets  In 
Belgium  are  In  a  less  unfavourable  position  than  their  counterparts  In 
the  rest of  the Communlty<3>. 
In  order  to  make  good  the  revenue  shortfall,  put  at  BFR  8.9 bn  In  the 
first  year<4>  the authorities have  taken  two  measures  : 
Increase  In  the  tax  burden  on  coordination centres  (BFR  1.4 bn); 
reduction  In  the  tax  concessions  for  firms  which  Increased  their 
capital  In  1982/83  (BFR  7,0 bn). 
They  have  also  acted  to  discourage  banks  from  buying  back  existing 
notes  (carrying  a  25X  withholding  tax)  In  order  to  replace  them  with 
new  notes  (on  which  withholding  tax  will  be  charged  at  only  10X).  This 
conversion would  add  significantly to  the shortfal I  In  tax  revenue<5>. 
The  lowering  of  the  withholding  tax  has  been  warmly  welcomed  on  the 
capital  market  with  the  authorities  being  In  a  position  In  March  1990 
to  place  a  bond  Issue  at  a  nominal  rate of  10X  (attracting withholding 
tax  at  10X)  entirely  with  private  Investors  without  recourse  to  the 
banking  consortium. 
( 1)  WI thho I  dIng  tax  was  Introduced  In  1962.  at  15X.  In  1967,  It  was 
Increased  to  20X.  When  It  was  raised  to  25X  In  1984,  It  was  In  ful I 
discharge of  tax  liability. 
(2)  Dividends  are stll I  subject  withholding  tax  at  a  rate of  25X. 
(3)  On  8  February  1989,  the  Commission  presented  a  draft  Directive 
(COM(89)60)  with  a  view  to  harmonizing  withholding  tax  on  Interest 
at  the  minimum  level  of  15X.  The  draft  Directive  was  not,  however, 
adopted. 
(4)  In  July  revised  to  BFR  5,5  bn  due  to a  shift  from  savings  accounts 
where  Interest  Income  up  to  BFR  50.000  Is  exempted  from  the 
withholding  tax  to  other  savings  Instruments  which  are  subject  to 
the withholding  tax. 
(5)  Such  common  forms  of  saving  total led  BFR  2  400  bn  In  1989  (some  40% 
of  personal  and  corporate savings with  credit  Institutions).  Taking 
an  average  Interest  rate  of  SX,  a  25X  withholding  tax  will  yield 
BFR  48  bn.  At  the  new  rate  of  10X,  the  figure  wl  I I  be  only 
BFR  19,2 bn. -58-
6.  CONCLUSIONS 
6.1  In  a  favourable  external  environment,  Belgium's  economic  policies 
have  contributed  to  a  considerable  lmcroyement  In  the  economic 
s I tuat !on  durIng  the  second  ha If  of  the  1980s.  A more  sustaIned 
growth  rate  has  been  restored  (4%  a  year),  mainly  In  response  to 
Investment  and  exports.  Although  unemployment  Is  stll I  high, 
employment  Is  expanding.  Inflation  Is  still  moderate,  despite  a 
rIse  In  recent  months.  There  has  been  a  sma II  current  account 
surplus since 1986. 
The  main  features  of  the  macroeconomic  policies  adopted  at  the 
beginning of  the  1980s  have  been  as  follows: 
exchange-rate  policy  was  gradually  t lghtened  up,  leading  In 
June  1990  to  the  formal  and  public  commitment  to  follow  the 
strong  EMS  currencies.  This  will  further  enhance  the 
credlbl I lty of  the monetary  authorities  ; 
the  poI Icy  of  wage  moder at I  on  was  cont I  nued  and  the 
competitiveness of  the economy  Identified as an  economic  pol Icy 
objectIve  the  Importance  of  whIch,  wIth  a  vIew  to  1992,  was 
recognized  by  both  sides of  Industry; 
budgetary  policy  was  guided  by  two  principles:  a  reduction  In 
the  pub I I  c  defIcIt  desIgned  to  Interrupt  the  process  of  debt 
and  Interest  accumulation  and  a  reform  of  the  tax  system  based 
on  priorities that  have,  however,  changed  In  recent  years. 
Structural  reforms  have  also  been  embarked  upon  that  will  affect 
how  the  Belgian  economy  fits  Into  the  single  European  market  after 
1992: 
the  modernization  and  reorganization  of  financial  markets 
through  more  active  pub! lc-debt  management  and  a  reform  of  the 
Brusse Is  stock  exchange  shou I  d  encourage  the  deve I  opment  of 
financial  activity,  which  has  so  far  been  very  local  In  nature; 
the  reform  of  taxation,  which  started with  measures  adopted  In 
the  1989  and  1990  budgets,  Is  essentially  consistent  with  the 
alms  of  simplifying  and  reducing  taxation  of  personal  Incomes 
and  eventually of  corporate  Incomes; 
a  change  In  approach  towards  Intervention  by  the authorities  In 
the  monetary  and  financial  fields,  due  regard  being  had  to  the 
prospect  of  economic  and  monetary  union  In  Europe.  In  this 
connect !on,  mentIon  can  be  made  of  the  abo II t !on  of  the  two-
tier  exchange  market,  which  had  become  superfluous,  the 
lowering  of  the  withholding  tax  on  fixed  Income  from  new 
financial  assets  and  the  Intention  of  adjusting  and  enlarging 
the  panoply  of  monetary  policy  Instruments  with  a  view,  among 
other  thIngs,  to  makIng  the  centra I  bank  more  Independent  of 
the  budgetary authorities. -59-
6.2 However,  there  are still  malor  disequilibria,  and  the  strategy 
embarked  upon  with  a  view  to  adapting  the  ae~glan  economy  to 
the  Cornmun I ty-w I  de  market  must  take  account  of  a  number  of 
risks: 
like  most  Community  countr les,  Belgium  must  bear  In  mind  the 
risk  of  faster  Inflation  due  to  the  greater  uncertainty  of 
external  factors,  the  pressure  of  demand  In  relation  to 
productive  capacity  In  certain  Industries  and  the  strains  on 
wages  that  might  result  from  the  Imbalances  discernible on  the 
labour  market; 
on  the  labour  market,  the  unemployment  rate still  stands  at  9% 
of  the  labour  force,  and  the number  of  long-term unemployed  Is 
very  high.  Possible  Improvements  are  hampered  by  a  mismatch 
between  supply and  demand; 
the  public  deficit  Is  still  equivalent  to  6%  of  GOP  and  Is 
unl lkely  to dec I lne  In  the short  term.  The  burden  of  Interest 
payments  absorbs  25%  of  current  revenue  (11%  of  GOP)  and, 
although  the  government's  dual-target  budget  strategy  has  made 
for  a  stabilization  of  the  debt/GOP  ratio,  the  latter  stands 
at  around  130%; 
a  t lghtenlng  of  monetary  policies  In  Europe,  which  Belgium 
would  now  be  more  liable  to  follow  because  of  Its  strong 
currency  option,  would  be  felt  more  severely  than  elsewhere 
because  of  the  budgetary  situation  and  the  Impact  of  any  rise 
In  short  term  rates on  debt  servicing costs. 
although  the  national  savings  ratio  has  Increased  and  the 
financial  structures  of  firms  have  Improved  considerably,  the 
level  at  which  savings  match  Investment  Is  still  fairly  low, 
especial IY  In  view  of  the  adjustment  needs  of  Industry  and  the 
servIce  sector  faced  as  they  are  wIth  the  prospect  of  the 
Community-wide  market.  It  wl  I I  therefore  be  difficult  to 
preserve  the  financial  equilibria  Belgium  has  only  recently 
restored.  The  high  level  of  dlssavlng  In  the  public  sector 
must,  under  the circumstances,  remain  a  major  concern; 
the  efficiency  of  financial  markets  appears  to  have  been 
weakened  by  a  I  ack  of  transparency  and  by  an  undu I  y  r I  g I  d 
approach  to  the setting of  Interests rates which  Is  restricting 
competition and  Impeding  development  of Brussels as  a  financial 
centre; 
the  structural  reforms  under  way  In  the  financial  field  should 
be  speeded  up  In  order  to  ensure  that  neither  the  stock 
exchange  nor  the  bankIng  system  fa II  behInd  as  regards  the 
progressive establ lshment  of  a  European  financial  area. -60-
6.3 A decisive  step  was  taken  In  the  process  of  Institutional  reform 
started  at  the  beginning  of  the  1970s,  by  the  adoption  In  August 
1988  of  the  law  extending  the  powers  of  the  Regions  and  the 
Convnunltles  <concerning  In  particular  the  transfer  of 
responslbl I lty  for  education)  and  In  January  1989  of  the  law 
organizing  their  financing.  At  the  moment,  the  budgetary 
lmpl lcatlons of  federal lzatlon are stl II  difficult  to assess. 
Some  points can  nevertheless be  stated  : 
the  resources  which  will  be  granted  to  the  Communities  and  to 
the  Reg Ions  have  been  ca I  cuI a ted  on  a  reI at I  ve I  y  restrIctIve 
basis; 
It  can  certainly be  hoped  that  regional lzatlon wll I  result  In  a 
better  allocation of  resources  and  greater efficiency op  publ lc 
expenditure  from  an  economic  point  of  view.  In  the  long  term 
the  financial  responslbll lty  granted  to  local  bodies  Is  likely 
to favour  sounder  management; 
however,  the  new  system  does  not  really  Involve  any  Incentives 
for  the  local  bodies  to  contain  their  deficits.  There  could, 
however,  be  limits  of  two  types:  (I)  first,  the  borrowing 
condItIons  whIch  are  Imposed  by  the  market  - even  though  the 
Regions  and  Communities  have  the  advantage,  compared  with  the 
central  government,  of  starting  from  a  healthy  situation 
Insofar  as  the  debt  of  the  past  Is  not  their  responslbllltly; 
<I  I>  second,  the  app II cat I  on  of  one  of  the  safeguard  c I  auses 
provided  for  by  the  law,  which  enable  the government  to place a 
temporary  I lmlt  on  the  borrowing  capacity  of  one  or  more 
bodies; 
for  the  centra I  government,  the  amounts  to  be  transferred  to 
the  local  bodies  are  a  mass  of  Irreducible  expenditure,  as  Is 
the burden  of  Interest on  the existing publ lc debt. 
More  generally,  and  looking  ahead  to  the  achievement  of  an  Economic 
and  Monetary  Union  In  Europe,  the  very  complexity  of  the  system 
establ lshed  In  Belgium  could make  lnegratlon more  difficult  because 
of  the  multlpl Ietty  of  authorities  (three  Regions  and  three 
Communities  which  do  not  overlap)  and  because  of  the  complex 
financial  relationships  which  have  been  established  and  which  are 
I table  to harm  the  transparency of  budgetary  pol Icy. -61-
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